How to decode Iranian state media: A field guide for newsrooms and OSINT researchers
A comprehensive directory of state organs, forensic NGOs, and digital tools for verifying news within Iran
This field guide for Eurovision News Spotlight centralizes our primary investigative leads for Iran. By mapping these sources — from official state organs to specialized forensic NGOs — we aim to provide our members and subscribers with a comprehensive directory for verification and cross-border reporting.
⚠️ NOTE: Given the nationwide internet blackout that began on January 8, 2026, many official links may be intermittent. Use connectivity monitors to verify if a source could realistically be transmitting from within Iran at a specific timestamp.
🏛️ 1. Official government & state entities (OSINT entry points)
These sources represent the official narrative and provide the baseline for state policy, judicial actions, and security operations.
Khamenei.ir: The official portal for the Supreme Leader; critical for tracking high-level “red lines” and ideological shifts.
President.ir: The executive branch’s primary communication channel for domestic policy and diplomatic engagement.
The Official Gazette (Ruznameh Rasmi): The state record for all laws and, crucially, corporate registrations. Essential for identifying state-linked businesses and shell companies.
IRNA (Islamic Republic News Agency): The primary state-run news agency for official government announcements.
Tasnim News Agency: Heavily linked to the IRGC; a vital source for monitoring security-sector narratives and regional military activity.
Fars News Agency: Another hardline security-linked outlet, often used to broadcast “confessions” or state-sanctioned leaks.
Mapping Iranian state media control
While all state media ultimately answer to the Supreme Leader, the operational control is split between the “Traditional” state apparatus (Cabinet-level) and the “Parallel” military apparatus (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps).
MOIS vs. IRGC-IO
These two entities often operate as rivals. This competition can result in conflicting reports on the same event, which journalists can use to gauge internal regime tensions.
The MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence): Answers to the President, but is led by a cleric approved by the Supreme Leader. Generally handles ‘traditional’ bureaucracy and civil surveillance.
The IRGC-IO (Intelligence Organization of the Guard): A parallel, more powerful agency that answers only to the Supreme Leader. It has largely eclipsed MOIS in domestic security and ‘cybervigilance’.
🔍 2. Investigative NGOs & human rights monitors
These organizations provide the primary evidence used to counter state narratives and document human rights conditions.
HRANA (Human Rights Activists News Agency): Managed by Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA); the most granular source for daily arrest data and prisoner documentation.
Center for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI): Provides deep-dive legal analysis and advocacy briefings based on a robust network of in-country lawyers and activists.
Hengaw Organization for Human Rights: The leading source for tracking security incidents and rights violations in the Kurdish regions and western border provinces.
Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO): Based in Norway; provides verified statistics on executions and protest-related fatalities.
Impact Iran: A coalition of NGOs that consolidates evidence for the UN Fact-Finding Mission (FFMI); excellent for long-form investigative background.
📡 3. Digital forensics & connectivity labs
Used for verifying the timing and origin of digital content during the 2026 internet disruptions.
The Iranian Archive (Mnemonic): A forensic-grade repository preserving over a million digital artefacts for legal accountability.
Filterwatch: Analyzes the technical architecture of Iran’s censorship; vital for understanding how content is being throttled or blocked.
NetBlocks (Iran): Provides real-time connectivity metrics to verify if a video was uploaded during a localized shutdown.
IODA (Internet Outage Detection & Analysis): Academic-grade infrastructure monitoring for identifying ISP-level interference.
ASL19: A technology lab specializing in censorship circumvention and digital safety for Iranian users.
🏗️ 4. Specialized investigative tools & media
IranWire: A collaborative platform with a dedicated fact-checking section that deconstructs state-sponsored viral disinformation.
Spreading Justice: A database that profiles alleged human rights violators; a key OSINT tool for identifying security personnel.
DFRLab (Atlantic Council): Investigates Iranian influence operations and “sockpuppet” networks on social media.
UC Berkeley Human Rights Center: High-capacity verification lab that partners with newsrooms to process large volumes of user-generated content (UGC).
🏗️ 5. Technical appendix for blackout OSINT
To navigate the current total blackout, newsrooms should employ these specialized forensic tactics:
A. Geolocation markers (Urban context)
Yellow gas pipes: Iran has a unique external yellow gas piping system on building exteriors. Configuration patterns help confirm Iranian urban settings.
Charity boxes (Sadaqah): Distinctive blue and yellow metal boxes found on street corners. Specific municipal branding can narrow down a city location.
B. The intranet loophole & metadata
Domestic apps: Monitor Rubika, Eitaa, and Bale. These state-sanctioned apps often function when the global internet is cut.
Solar Hijri metadata: Files created in Iran use the Solar Hijri (SH) calendar.
Example: January 11, 2026, is 21 Dey 1404.
Check metadata for the year 1404 to verify recent capture.
🎖️ 6. Security personnel recognition
📡 7. Monitoring channels
The following channels provide the signals that feed the newsroom. Content from these sources must be treated as leads and subjected to the verification and clearance protocols before being published or broadcast.
Independent, international & grassroots aggregators
Vahid Online (@VahidOnline): A prominent Iranian internet activist known for documenting protests mainly through footage he receives directly from Iranian demonstrators.
Hengaw Organization (@Hengaw_Org): Human rights monitoring channel with specialized data on Kurdish regions and political detainees.
HAALVSH (@haalvsh): Activists group based outside Iran, mainly focusing on news from Sistan and Baluchestan province
BBC Persian (@bbcpersian): Telegram bureau of the BBC. High-standard verified reports and regional analysis.
Iran International (@IranintlTV): Diaspora-based network with royalist allegiance. Have citizen contributors inside Iran.
Sima-ye Azadi (@SimaINTV): satellite TV channel (INTV) of People’s Mojahedin Organization, providing footage of civil unrest and resistance.
FreedomMessenger (@FreedoMessenger): Telegram channel linked to People’s Mojahedin Organization.
Saberin News (@Saberin_ir): Telegram channel with very close ties to IRGC and Basij forces.
Akhbar Montakhab (@akhbar_montakhab): Large-scale aggregator of trending news and social media content from official channels within Iran.
NE_WG (@NE_WG): Technical/Network monitoring; often used for tracking internet connectivity and censorship circumvention tools.
State-linked, official & semi-official outlets
MFA Iran (@MFAIran): Official channel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for diplomatic signalling.
IRNA English (@Irna_en): Official state news agency (English service).
Fars News (@farsna): Semi-official agency closely linked to the security apparatus. Essential for monitoring “official” narratives.
Tasnim News (@Tasnimnews): Semi-official outlet often used to broadcast messages from the IRGC.
SEPAH (@SEPAH): Unofficial but high-following channel carrying IRGC-related news and propaganda. 🚩 Note: Recent IRGC statements (2025) clarify that most “@Sepah” handles remain unofficial despite their content.
ISNA (@isna94): Iranian Students’ News Agency. Provides detailed reporting on domestic policy and student movements.
PadDolat (@PadDolat): ‘Information Base of the Government.’ Often used for official messaging and government-aligned perspectives.
Parsineh News (@parsinehnews): Analytical news site often reflecting specific political factions within the establishment.
Breaking news & rapid aggregators
Akharin Khabar (@akharinkhabar): One of the most popular news apps in Iran; provides high-speed updates across all sectors.
Akhbare Fori (@akhbarefori): Massive “Breaking News” aggregator. High discovery value but high risk of unverified viral content.
Khabar Fouri (@khabar_furei): Rapid-fire breaking news. 🚩 Check for advertising/clickbait redirects.
Khabar Farda (@khabarfarda_ir): Emerging news signal focused on political and economic forecasts.
Akhbare Movasagh (@akhbaremovasagh_ir): Self-described “Reliable News” aggregator; requires standard cross-referencing.
Khabar 75 (@khabar75) & Iran F News (@iranfnews): General news signals often mirroring state or semi-official reports.
Jarian (@Jarian_com): Digital media platform tracking social and political trends.
President Fans (@president_irFans): Unofficial fan channel monitoring pro-government sentiment.
Humanitarian & specialized monitoring
ICRC Iran (@icrc_iran): Official International Committee of the Red Cross channel for neutral humanitarian data.
KM_AP (@km_ap): Often used for localized or specialized monitoring (verify specific region of focus).
AdsVipz (@AdsVipz): Ad-network channel; useful for monitoring commercial activity or “sponsored” propaganda campaigns.
🗣️ 8. Glossary of state keywords & narratives
Monitoring the Iranian news wires requires a ‘translation layer’ to gauge escalation.