The world’s climate negotiators, heading deep into the Amazon in Belém, Brazil, for COP30, are facing key political challenges as disinformation campaigns are used to attack the legitimacy of the conference.

Promises are often made at the United Nations Climate Change Conferences. Known as COPs, these gatherings are where countries and other ‘parties’ that are signed up to the Framework Convention on Climate Change meet annually.

That list of parties is long. In a rare show of global unity, 198 parties have signed up to the 1992 treaty that pledges to “stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations” — although the treaty is not legally binding.

As the climate emergency has become more acute in recent years, the COP summits have drawn criticism, even from those who support their aims. This year’s COP is almost a fortnight long, not including a summit of world leaders beforehand, and many of its tens of thousands of attendees will have to fly to get there. Sometimes, as this year, the conferences are held in ecologically vulnerable areas, a deliberate choice that organizers say aims to raise awareness about the effects of climate change.

A group of leading climate policy experts, including Ban Ki-moon, Mary Robinson and Christiana Figueres, wrote in a joint letter last year that UN climate summits were “no longer fit for purpose”, adding that it was time to shift from negotiation to implementation. They also called for stricter rules on fossil fuel lobbying during the conference held in major oil and gas producer, Azerbaijan. A year earlier, the conference was held in Dubai, another oil-rich state.

Away from the logistics of the conference itself, public trust in what can truly be achieved at a policy level is shaky. Thirty years on from the first edition, the Earth is a worse situation. And just last month, 10 years after the Paris Climate Agreement was signed, UN Secretary-General António Guterres acknowledged that humanity had missed its target of limiting global heating to +1.5°C.

The mammoth task of repairing environmental damage everywhere requires cooperation in every corner of the globe. Despite this, the United States announced that it would not be sending any high-level officials to the conference, weeks after President Donald Trump stood up at the UN General Assembly and called climate change the world’s “greatest con job”.

Along with the legitimate criticism of the COP summits, there is a significant disinformation element that threatens to derail any progress that does spring from international cooperation. From climate change denial to economic obfuscation and spiralling climate fatalism, many strands of narratives have been woven around efforts to remedy our failing planet.

The method

An analysis by members of Eurovision News Spotlight of climate disinformation appearing on social media in Europe shows an increasingly sophisticated approach that has moved beyond simplistic climate denial.

The analysis focused on social media activity spanning five months, from May 1 to October 1, 2025. This period was strategically chosen to capture the evolution of narratives from post-COP29 political cycles through the major summer news events and into the final months before COP30 in Belém.

The analysis employed a quantitative content analysis of posts on the X platform (formerly Twitter) to map the discourse attacking global climate ambition in the lead-up to COP30.

A total of 70,000 tweets were collected: a sample of 10,000 each across Finland, Spain, Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, Belgium and France, uncovering a multi-front playbook aimed at destabilizing the narrative around climate action.

The analysis suggests the presence of a campaign not to win a factual debate but to leverage psychological levers to create policy paralysis.

The psychology of climate misinformation

Climate denial campaigns go beyond challenging facts; they leverage how people process information and form beliefs. By leveraging our natural tendencies, these campaigns create doubt, foster discord, and can paralyse action. To effectively counter their impact, it’s crucial to understand four key psychological levers that they can manipulate.

• Confirmation bias: People tend to seek out, interpret, and remember information that confirms their existing beliefs or political identity. Climate disinformation often tailors its message to specific political or ideological groups, making it instantly more palatable.

• Motivated reasoning: This is the tendency to reject accurate information that conflicts with deeply held values or personal/economic interests. If a climate solution threatens a person’s job or lifestyle, they are motivated to find reasons to believe the disinformation that discredits that solution.

• The propaganda technique: Disinformation campaigns often flood the zone with numerous, poorly supported, and easily debunked claims. The sheer volume makes it impossible for fact-checkers or the public to keep up, for example, creating the impression that “scientists are still debating.”

• Availability heuristic: Emotional responses override rational thought. Disinformation often uses high-emotion language (anger, fear, outrage) to bypass critical thinking and encourage immediate sharing, especially on social media.

Index

1. Attacking solutions (Renewable energy and technology)

2. Economic denial

3. Attacking global governance & elite hypocrisy

4. Minimizing climate impacts

5. Discrediting messengers & institutions

1. Attacking solutions (Renewable energy and technology)

Renewable energy (like wind and solar) is unreliable, too expensive, and will cause massive blackouts.

Example: Following the April 28, 2025, blackout across Spain and Portugal, misinformation quickly spread, falsely blaming it on Spain’s growing reliance on solar and wind power.

Spain’s far-right party, Vox, accused the government of concealing the true cause. Parliamentary spokesperson Pepa Millán told Congress that officials “know perfectly well what has happened and they don’t want to say it,” directly blaming the government for the blackout.

In the United States, 17 Republican Attorneys General cited the Spanish blackout in a public letter urging the US government to boycott COP30.

Despite the growing tide of misinformation, investigators from ENTSO-E, the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity, identified the real cause: voltage-control failures and cascading technical faults, not solar or wind power.

Why people believe it: FUD, fear, and cognitive bias

The belief that renewable energy is fundamentally unreliable is not grounded in engineering principles but rather in a successful rhetorical strategy. This narrative exploits the Availability Heuristic, a cognitive shortcut that leads people to think that emotionally charged events they can easily remember are more likely to occur than they really are.

Cass R. Sunstein, the Robert Walmsley University Professor at Harvard Law School, argues that our decision-making, both personal and political, is often driven by a psychological preference for a good story or a vivid image over statistics.

The FUD (Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt) campaign offers the public a simple reason to stick to the known energy infrastructure, while ignoring the external costs of fossil fuels—such as the massive health impacts from air pollution and the escalating disaster costs due to climate change—that are not reflected in their market price. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) says that rapid growth in renewable energy use by 2030 could save up to USD 4.2 trillion per year worldwide.

Countering the narrative: Economic inevitability and engineering solutions

The foundation of the anti-renewable argument—that clean energy is too expensive—has been thoroughly undermined by market forces and technological progress.

Solar photovoltaic costs have fallen by 90% in the last decade, onshore wind by 70%, and batteries by more than 90% according to a study by Global Change Data Lab, a non-profit organisation based in the United Kingdom, making new wind and solar projects the most economically competitive sources of electricity globally.

The decrease in cost comes as technologies follow Wright’s Law, or the experience curve effect, which states that technology becomes consistently cheaper as cumulative production increases.

The materials and land required for electric vehicles (EVs) and renewables are more environmentally destructive than burning fossil fuels.

Why people believe it: “Whataboutism” and false equivalence

This tactic attempts to discredit a solution by pointing out a different, albeit real, problem (e.g., mining for battery components), thereby creating a false equivalence that suggests no action is better than an imperfect one. Joakim Kulin, associate professor (Docent) in sociology at Sweden’s Umeå University, says this is recognized as a key discourse of climate delay used to justify inaction.

The shift to a green economy, which requires visible infrastructure like open-pit mines and wind/solar farms, is often viewed by the public as more damaging than the old system. Because the harm from fossil fuels, like invisible CO2 or distant oil pollution, is easier to ignore. The new visual impacts, being right in front of people, are therefore more likely to be perceived as a bigger, more immediate threat, according to a study by researchers at Slovakia’s Technical University of Košice.

A 2021 white paper by the International Council on Clean Transportation states that people often focus on the considerable initial environmental “cost” of manufacturing an EV battery or a solar panel. This initial impact is dramatic, but they fail to account for the years of operational benefits (zero emissions) that result from avoiding the continuous, cumulative damage of burning fossil fuels.

Countering the narrative: Fewer emissions from EVs, but critical minerals key

Running an electric vehicle is not completely free of fossil fuels, even though it’s possible to generate electricity entirely from renewables. For example, the EU says that in 2023, 45% of the power generated came from renewables, while fossil fuel power plants, such as gas and coal, accounted for 31.7% of electricity (the rest was nuclear-generated). The amount of electricity in the grid that’s fully renewables-generated varies from country to country, but on the other hand, it’s unlikely to be 100% fossil-fuel generated — whereas a petrol or diesel car, by its nature, is 100% run on fossil fuels.

The other side of the EV argument is the energy and waste associated with manufacturing the cars. Some studies have shown that making an EV can create more pollution than a traditional car, because of the energy required to make the battery. However, a full lifecycle assessment by Argonne National Laboratory (used in an explainer published by the EPA) showed that while the beginning and end of an EV's life are more emissions-intensive, the impact of these vehicles is lower over their entire life, as they have no exhaust emissions. Sustainable and circular-economy practices, including battery recycling, are rapidly improving, but there is room to improve how we manage the disposal and recycling of all our battery and electronic devices, including cars.

The land requirements for renewable energy is another argument. It’s true that some renewable sources, like solar and wind energy, require large areas for installation and could harm biodiversity in those areas. However, a 2024 analysis by the European Environmental Bureau found that Europe has sufficient land to expand solar and wind energy without compromizing nature or agricultural needs.

Wind turbines, solar panels, and any associated batteries or cabling are also, at their core, tech devices that require specific materials that must be mined. The International Energy Agency, in its reports on global critical minerals, has consistently referenced increased demand for critical minerals such as copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements — specifically for energy transition applications and other technological uses. The impact of our increased use of these products — both for renewable energy and for our everyday tech devices — will be a key challenge for climate decision-makers in the years to come.

2. Economic denial

The solution to climate change, net zero, is economically damaging and will bankrupt the nation and impoverish normal people.

Example: The 2023 UK policy rollbacks (e.g., delaying the ban on petrol and diesel cars from 2030 to 2035) were justified by then-Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, who argued that it’s wrong to “impose such significant costs on working people.” This statement directly validated the “cost-scepticism” narrative pushed by groups like the Tufton Street network.

The risk of a “backlash” against the wider mission—the very outcome sought by the economic deniers—justified the policy pause to find a “pragmatic, proportionate, and realistic approach,” Sunak said at the time.

Sunak defended his climate rollbacks and referenced the financial anxiety argument in a BBC interview at the time, saying he did not believe “ordinary families up and down the country” should have to “fork out” thousands of pounds to make the transition to greener vehicles.

Why people believe it: Financial anxiety meets justification

This narrative succeeds by weaponizing financial anxieties among the population, a fear fuelled by rising costs and insecurity. When a policy (like a climate tax or regulation) is framed as a threat to one’s wallet, it triggers an emotional response that makes people less rational.

This fear is then rationalized through motivated reasoning, a cognitive bias in which people interpret information to support a desired conclusion, in this case, their economic stability. In the Journal of Economics, French economists Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole theorize that people hold certain beliefs partly because they assign value to them, reflecting an implicit trade-off between accuracy and desirability.

Countering the narrative: Immeasurable cost of climate change itself

This is a question of short-term versus long-term thinking, and has been the subject of much debate. Which is more expensive: measures to end climate change now, or the cost climate change might incur in the future?

For decision-makers, finding the balance between the nation's financial health today and a healthy, economically sound population in the future is a tightrope walk. The long-term nature of some generational debates around climate change does not always align with the short-term electoral cycles in most European countries and across the Global North.

The economic narrative ignores the long-term, devastating costs of climate inaction. There are significant infrastructural and societal costs associated with extreme weather events — including reconstruction work, insurance payouts, and, indeed, deaths.

In a Q&A with Group Chief Economist for insurance giant AXA, Gilles Moëc — published on the firm’s own website — he said: “Often, the economic cost of climate change is first insidious then dramatic”. Outside of the obvious human cost of disasters, the rising frequency of extreme weather events causes disruptions in global supply chains or demands huge capital for things like building upgrades to adapt to new temperatures, he added.

Any climate volatility for farmers also adds to food insecurity, and is already leading to displacement in places like Central America, where environmental factors are playing a greater role in the movement of people north into the United States. In 2022 alone, more than 32.6 million people were displaced worldwide by floods, windstorms, earthquakes or droughts, according to a European Parliament briefing document about ‘climate refugees’.

It is difficult to count the true cost of climate change. However, a 2024 report commissioned by the International Chamber of Commerce estimated that climate-related extreme weather events cost the global economy more than €2 trillion in the previous decade.

Furthermore, market data shows the green transition is an economic opportunity; for example, new utility-scale solar and wind are often cheaper than new fossil fuel capacity (LCOE), and adaptation policies are net job creators (ILO estimates millions of new “green jobs”).

As for the cost to individuals: governments can choose whether or not to financially incentivize green choices. In some countries, it has proven politically unpopular to push voters towards changing their heating systems or their cars, for the benefit of a future that might be too far away for governments to reap the political reward. It’s up to world leaders to decide what measures today could be considered good value when the maths are done on the present and future cost of climate change to the economy.

The domestic policy to achieve net zero is an “unaffordable” and “ideological” burden on the nation...

Example: The Tufton Street network (e.g., Global Warming Policy Foundation/Net Zero Watch) in Westminster drives the “economic denial” campaign. This network, which has been accused of receiving “dark money” from US foundations linked to major fossil fuel companies (like Donors Trust), pushes the narrative that net zero will bankrupt the nation. This pressure is credited with leading to the 2023 UK policy rollbacks.

Why people believe it: The confluence of cost, control, and identity

The argument that net zero is too expensive and driven by “ideology” works because of practical motivated reasoning, the psychological tendency to believe what is easiest or most convenient, as shown in the model of climate inaction.

A study by academics into class aspects of the green transition and the threat of right-wing populism in Poland argues that without reducing social inequalities, the nationalist right will find a pretext to “defend” the “common people” against “additional financial burdens resulting from costly or disruptive environmental policies.”

By labeling net zero as “ideological,” critics suggest that climate goals are only for the rich and that immediate costs, such as heating bills, matter more than future environmental benefits.

The movement also exploits feelings of national control.

An analysis of energy nationalism by universities in Finland, Spain and Poland finds that critics claim climate goals force nations to hand over control of key energy resources and domestic industry to international groups, directly threatening national sovereignty.

Prioritizing domestic fossil fuels is now framed as “protecting energy security” and “self-sufficiency,” which the CIDOB Policy Brief (Spain) and the Independent Review of Net Zero (UK) both note are treated as patriotic duties. Writing in Global Studies Quarterly, academics Duncan McLaren and Olaf Corry argue that this converts climate action into a cultural fight for freedom against overreaching government, making calls for delay sound like essential national defence.

Countering the narrative: The cost of delay

The actual cost of this political strategy is the delay itself, which impedes any ability to try and stay under or close to the +1.5°C warming limit. Delay might be cheaper now, but stands to become more expensive in years to come when more impacts of climate change are felt. These impacts would not be as extreme if countries limited warming now.

For example, a study published in the Nature journal relating to Ireland found that “delayed mitigation brings forward the need for a net-zero target by five years, risks carbon lock-in and stranded assets, increases reliance on carbon dioxide removal technologies and leads to higher long-term mitigation costs”.

The cost of transition will continue to be a sticking point for governments and their economists, as they try to balance the books today with what could be coming down the tracks tomorrow.

3. Attacking global governance & elite hypocrisy

COP30 is hypocritical, just a lavish waste of time and money for global elites that won’t result in any real action.

The critique of major climate summits, such as the COPs, centres on hypocrisy. With thousands of delegates, most arriving by air, some using high-emission private jets, the event’s carbon footprint directly contradicts its core mission: reducing global emissions.

This makes the conference an easy target for critics to accuse the attendees of being out of touch. Those from political and corporate life who participate are often perceived as being insulated from the real-world costs of the energy transition—such as increased energy bills or job losses in fossil fuel sectors—and are seen as merely “virtue-signalling” while indulging in high-carbon lifestyles.

Why people believe it: The authenticity gap

These massive gatherings are frequently dismissed as wasteful. They are widely perceived not as serious working sessions, but rather as expensive “global cocktail parties” where substantive, actionable progress is minimal.

This scepticism is compounded by the historical reality of the international climate process, which has a long track record of agreements, like the Kyoto Protocol, failing to make a substantial impact on the climate problem. This pattern of historical failure actively erodes public confidence in the entire mechanism.

These perceived flaws fuel a powerful, ready-made narrative that is highly effective for anti-climate-action movements. This narrative simplifies the complex negotiations into a potent us-versus-them argument: “They are trying to destroy your economy and way of life with expensive, unreliable energy, while they party.”

This view thrives on the event’s bad optics, where readily available media images — delegates flying private, staying in luxury, and using motorcades — overshadow the slow, intricate, and less visually engaging work of the actual negotiations.

International climate conferences like COP30 are structurally vulnerable because they require extensive, high-carbon logistics — a new Amazon highway and cruise ships for delegates. Scholars note these visible, tangible contradictions create a legitimate “authenticity gap.” Anti-climate action narratives weaponize this hypocrisy, transforming these logistical flaws into intentional symbols of elite corruption.

They magnify the images of elite consumption and logistical flaws, framing them not as logistical errors, but as intentional symbols of corruption and disdain for the “ordinary person.” This exploitation leverages the Affect Heuristic, using high-emotion, outrage-inducing language (”fraudulent,” “rigged”) to bypass critical thought.

Example: The logistics for COP30 in Belém, Brazil, were strategically leveraged. This includes:

1. The construction of the Avenida Liberdade highway through 72 hectares of protected Amazon rainforest.

2. The decision was made to rent two cruise ships for 6,000 beds for delegate accommodation. Disinformation actors used these real logistical flaws to create a narrative of “unassailable hypocrisy.”

Countering the narrative: The role of COPs

COPs have long faced accusations of being lavish, and are fairly open to scrutiny as an event attended by governments, royalty and other so-called ‘elites’.

It’s fair to scrutinize the carbon and environmental impact of a conference that seeks to reduce all of the above. Organizers issued a note after critical news coverage, saying the road was not specifically built for the climate summit. However, local people still linked the road and the conference, telling reporters that while the project was talked about for 20 years, the approaching COP seemed to provide the justification to finally go ahead with it.

Another strand to this narrative says that nothing useful happens at COP summits. However, they represent the only mechanism for 198 parties to negotiate and formalize global climate agreements (like the Paris Agreement). Deals like these form the cornerstone of the world’s response to climate change, and the near-universal representation at COP is a rare unifying factor for the world.

The conferences are long and progress can be slow. This is due to the complexity of the event and the logistical, political, or even economic challenges. Countries and other parties at COP will be sent into negotiations to get the best deal for their region, argue for their domestic industries, and seek concessions on strict carbon targets.

COP30 is particularly important. At the 30th edition and 10 years after the signing of the Paris Climate Agreement, signatories are hearing that the targets set out in that plan will be missed. At this COP, they will be under pressure to come up with a solution that works for all.

The host nation, Brazil, is fundamentally hypocritical and corrupt; its internal policy contradictions prove its role as a global climate leader is a sham and that global action will fail.

Example: This narrative exploits two major contradictions simultaneously:

1. President Lula da Silva’s government is pursuing offshore oil development while hosting COP30.

2. The destruction of the Amazon rainforest for the Avenida Liberdade highway.

These actions are used to argue that Brazil’s rhetoric contradicts its actions.

Why people believe it: Financial gain hypocrisy

The strength of this narrative lies in its ability to appeal to two opposed audiences.

For climate sceptics and naysayers, Brazil’s perceived hypocrisy provides ammunition to delegitimize the entire concept of global climate action; the reasoning is that if a crucial global player cannot commit, the whole process is fundamentally flawed or merely a developed-world distraction.

For critics and the sceptical public, the narrative validates a deep-seated suspicion that political leaders everywhere prioritize tangible, short-term economic gains—like oil revenue or immediate infrastructure—over long-term environmental commitments.

The perceived betrayal of trust by a major player like Brazil fosters cynicism, leading to the belief that the pursuit of financial gain always prevails and making effective international action seem unattainable.

Countering the narrative: Brazil must work to re-establish credibility

Brazil has long been accused of climate hypocrisy. When President Lula returned to power in 2023, he pledged to make Brazil a climate action champion once more.

On the positive side, deforestation in the Amazon rainforest hit an 11-year low in 2025. However, the country has begun to loosen some environmental law and allowed oil drilling near the mouth of the Amazon River for the first time. Lula said the decision to drill for oil will raise revenue that would help fund the transition to cleaner energy. The debacle is a black stain on Brazil’s image, and unfolded just weeks before the COP30 summit.

The Brazilian government has defended its record. Environment minister Marina Silva said drilling for oil alongside climate ambitions is a contradiction that exists throughout the world. Lula himself has argued that the world will still need oil in the years to come, appearing to suggest that it and the pursuit of greener alternatives were not mutually exclusive.

On Avenida Liberdade, Brazilian federal officials explicitly distanced the federal administration’s planning for the COP conference and the highway project.

For those in power in Brazil, re-establishing the country as a hub of climate ambition will be a key challenge at COP30 and in the years to come. Contradictory policies or apparent hypocrisy risks undermining the country’s credibility as a leader in this space — a worry for a world looking to the custodians of the Amazon to save one of the world’s most important carbon sinks.

Developing nations, like Brazil, shouldn’t have to cut emissions because Western nations are the historical polluters. Therefore, the outcome is unfair.

Example: China has been operating coal-fired power plants for decades, accounting for a large share of the world’s current emissions. Forcing them to transition to renewables now puts an unfair economic burden on their development, while the West got rich polluting freely.

Why people believe it: Western nations are overwhelmingly responsible for the current climate crisis

The argument that developing nations should not bear equal responsibility for emission cuts is rooted in the principle of climate equity and historical responsibility.

A New York Times analysis found that 23 rich, industrialized countries are responsible for 50% of all historical emissions, while more than 150 countries are responsible for the rest.

This imbalance forms the ethical basis for “climate debt,” where the Global North is seen as owing the Global South for past pollution and its present-day impacts.

This is legally formalized in international agreements under the principle of “Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities” (CBDR-RC). While all countries must take action on climate change, those that have polluted the most historically (the rich nations) have a greater responsibility.

Countering the narrative: Negotiations allow for individual arrangements

The principle of CBDR is already central to the UNFCCC. Developed nations do have a clear legal and moral obligation to provide climate finance and technology transfer. Some of the key points include that resources should be made available to improve the environment, taking into account the circumstances of developing countries, and that the special situation and needs of developing countries — particularly the most environmentally vulnerable — should be given special priority.

Over the years, there have also more specific concessions relating to the emissions outputs of a particular country, for example regarding the ozone layer, which allowed developing nations to delay compliance with overarching agreements. As the climate change situation — and our understanding of the science — evolves, negotiations at COP level allow for new arrangements to be put in place. Talks around how best to tackle the problem of climate change, in a way that is achievable for all countries, is a core part of what the COP summits are all about.

National sovereignty must be prioritized above global and legal climate obligations...

Example: Following the landmark ECtHR ruling in the KlimaSeniorinnen case, which found that Switzerland violated human rights due to insufficient climate action, the Swiss Parliament adopted an unprecedented declaration opposing the judgment. The country’s reliance on Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) (buying carbon offsets abroad) is also used to portray Switzerland as attempting to “buy its way out.”

Why people believe it: Climate action as a zero-sum conflict
This narrative is problematic because it frames international climate action as a zero-sum conflict in which global obligations threaten local autonomy or sovereignty, according to J.B. Ruhl, Co-Director of the Energy, Environment and Land Use Program at Vanderbilt University.

It appeals directly to national pride and populist scepticism by positioning powerful, unelected international courts as antagonistic to the will of the domestic legislature. This is a potent political tool, as it transforms a legal critique into a defence of sovereignty, which resonates deeply with nationalist and conservative audiences worldwide.

The complexity of the solution — relying on financial mechanisms like ITMOs (carbon offsets) — is immediately weaponized as a “transparency trap.” The concept is difficult for the public to grasp, making it easy to portray as a secretive, elite attempt by the government (or corporations) to “buy their way out” of their true responsibility, avoiding genuine domestic change. The Swiss Parliament's legal defiance then becomes apparent ‘proof’ of the plot.

Sabina Schnell, international public administration researcher at Syracuse University, argues that a lack of transparency in a post-fact world reduces trust in government and increases polarisation in deliberation. Schnell suggests that by adopting a reasoned transparency model—explaining the ‘why’ behind decisions and information, based on logic rather than just raw data—transparency’s value could be restored.

Countering the narrative: International legal obligation and accountability

The ECtHR ruling is legally binding under international human rights law. If a state breaches such rules, a case can be brought domestically and as far as the European Court of Human Rights, where the state could be ordered to change course, pay compensation, or correct the breach. The argument to ‘prioritize’ national sovereignty is irrelevant, because breaching international law is illegal.

Meanwhile, ‘ITMOs’ are Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes — aka carbon credits which are earned for emissions reductions — and the Paris Climate Agreement allows countries to buy and sell these credits. Many countries rely on ITMOs to meet or come closer to meeting their emissions targets, but this means that countries could meet their targets without doing all the work themselves. As the trading of ITMOs becomes more popular and a market builds around them, countries will have to determine whether or not the system is working.

4. Minimizing climate impacts

The +1.5°C goal is already unattainable, so why bother? We should focus on adaptation, not mitigation.

Why people believe it: “Doomism” and Fatalism:

This idea gives people a psychological break from constant worry about climate change. Saying the +1.5 °C goal is impossible means people feel less responsible for making hard choices to stop climate change. It speaks to a sense of fatalism and overload with bad news, essentially permitting everyone to stop struggling with an impossible task. Experts call this “doomism,” which can lead to inaction.

Switching the focus to adaptation is an attractive and politically easy choice. It lets leaders and the public focus on visible, local, and immediate defences rather than tackling the global changes needed (such as phasing out fossil fuels). This approach makes avoiding action look like simple, realistic problem-solving.

Countering the narrative: The Importance of Every Tenth of a Degree

The +1.5°C target is not a cliff-edge. Even if the +1.5°C target is not reached, every fraction of a degree above it could bring vastly different consequences, as laid out in the most recent IPCC Assessment Report (AR6) about future risks. This explains why even if we miss the target (which is inevitable at this point, as acknowledged by the UN last month) it is still worth trying to limit global warming as much as possible.

The summary of the report goes on to explain: “Global warming will continue to increase in the near term (2021-2040) mainly due to increased cumulative CO2 emissions in nearly all considered scenarios and modelled pathways … Every increment of global warming will intensify multiple and concurrent hazards (high confidence). Deep, rapid, and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions would lead to a discernible slowdown in global warming within around two decades, and also to discernible changes in atmospheric composition within a few years (high confidence).”

In simple terms: Every increment of warming of the Earth’s surface, even from +1.5 to +1.6°C, significantly increases the risk and severity of impacts. Cutting emissions is still crucial to limit future harm, and even if it should have been dealt with years ago, the next best option is to start right now.

Climate change is real, but a slow, gradual process. There’s no need for immediate, costly, disruptive action now.

Why people believe it: Economic and cognitive biases

This narrative works because it taps into strong psychological and financial habits. It gives people a comfortable way out of taking immediate, expensive action. It makes climate solutions seem like a huge cost that can simply be put off. A paper by Debika Shome and Sabine Marx of Center for Research on Environmental Decisions at Columbia University says this urge to delay comes from present bias: we care more about immediate costs than future benefits, even if ignoring the future creates huge dangers.

Daniel Kahneman, a senior scholar at Princeton University, argues that calling for “pragmatism” or “small changes” appeals to people who see themselves as balanced, non-extreme centrists, letting them dismiss fast, significant changes as “radical” or “crazy.” It also takes advantage of how hard it is for the human brain to grasp fast growth and long-term risk.

Climate problems often build slowly until they suddenly hit a crisis point, making the idea of “slow and steady” feel correct. This slow-burn idea protects old business models and lets people think of delay as a sensible, sound financial choice, rather than the dangerous risk it actually is.

Countering the narrative: Rapid action can stem catastrophic tipping points

Climate science clearly shows that the changes are non-linear. We risk crossing tipping points, like Amazon dieback or ice sheet collapse, which could lead to unstoppable, catastrophic warming.

These tipping points are critical thresholds on our planet. When they are crossed, they can trigger abrupt and potentially irreversible changes. The Global Tipping Points Report for 2025 says that we’ve already reached one of these thresholds: the world’s coral reefs are irreversibly dying off. Parts of the polar ice sheets may also already be at this point, which would bring the world into a new era of unstoppable sea level rise. As for the Amazon, if it were to transform from a rainforest that absorbs a lot of carbon dioxide into a savannah that actually produces carbon, it would vastly accelerate warming and limit nature’s ability to cope with the greenhouse gases humanity is producing.

Action must be rapid and transformative to avoid these thresholds, as outlined by the IPCC.

5. Discrediting messengers & institutions

Climate advocates and leaders are personal hypocrites; therefore, their demands for climate action are ‘double standards’ and unreasonable to impose on the public.

Example: The Finnish Green Party chair, Sofia Virta, was heavily targeted after posting about her vacation van trip through Europe. Right-wing representatives and social media users seized on the private drive, calling it a “double standard.”

Prominent representatives of the Finns Party and the National Coalition Party shared posts criticizing the Green Party for hypocrisy. Other X users argued that it is inappropriate to criticize others for private driving or eating meat if Virta drives around Europe for fun.’

Why people believe it: From policy effectiveness to personal moral integrity

This narrative shifts the discussion away from how well policies work and onto the leader’s personal morals. This lets people reject challenging, expensive demands for significant change (like emission cuts) by attacking the messenger’s perceived flawed personal life instead.

This approach is strongly driven by confirmation bias and the desire for an easy excuse. People who already doubt climate action or dislike ‘Green’ politics see a leader’s ‘private double standard’ (like the van trip) as a moral win. It confirms their belief that climate leaders are just elite hypocrites making rules they themselves ignore. This gives them an emotional reason to do nothing, as the moral blame is successfully moved away from systemic emissions and onto the perceived moral failure of elected officials.

Countering the narrative: Science doesn’t change regardless of messenger’s purity

Climate action is based on scientific consensus and systemic necessity, not the personal purity of individual advocates. There are many changes people might make if availability, time or financial restraints were not in the picture — for example, doing a food shop without purchasing any single-use plastic packaging would be very difficult in many countries, and there are people who live in remote areas for whom public transport is unavailable.

More broadly, a politician’s private travel choices, while open to scrutiny, do not invalidate the scientific data on which the policy platform for systemic emission reduction is built. Despite that, the personal behavior of politicians or activists on a green platform is highly scrutinized, so they sometimes self-police, make pledges or statements with their personal choices (Greta Thunberg famously sailed across the Atlantic in 2019 to attend a UN Climate summit in New York).

Conspiratorial Fusion

Climate policy (like net zero) is a covert instrument of social and economic manipulation and a component of a totalitarian plot...

Example: This narrative merges with suspicions and fears developed during past crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war. Posts argue that the “fear-mongering propaganda” from those events is being “rewritten” to fit the climate crisis. The simple, core message is that all crises are “engineered falsehoods.”

Why people believe it: All crises are fabricated

The main reason people believe this story is that it gives a straightforward explanation for their deep mistrust of institutions.

Dutch social psychologist and author Sander van der Linden argues for those who already think influential people are corrupt, mixing events—like COVID-19 lockdowns, shortages, and climate policy (net zero)—makes all global crises seem like proof that they are constantly being lied to.

Professors at the Universities of Chicago and Ohio argue that this larger story changes how people see climate action. It is no longer just science; it is the newest step in a plot to take away freedoms and control economies. The intense feeling and simplicity of having a single enemy make this claim a powerful way to gather anti-establishment and far-right groups, giving them justification for their isolation and anger.

Countering the narrative: Proposed measures backed up by science

Climate policy is driven by overwhelming, peer-reviewed climate science and there is no evidence of a secret control plot. In fact, it would arguably be easier for domestic politicians to avoid climate measures, which can often be unpopular; they are pressured to do so by the weight of scientific evidence and legally-binding agreements (such as EU climate law which penalizes member states for non-compliance).

Mitigation and adaptation policies are openly implemented by governments, often in response to scientific bodies such as the IPCC and international agreements, like those negotiated and agreed upon at COP summits.

Measures like the green transition are publicly aimed at preventing catastrophic warming. As attitudes and the world economy shift in this direction, these measures are increasingly being presented as economic opportunities.

Expert faking

Expert façade are used to assert unjustified authority over discredited, unscientific claims, thereby exploiting the public’s natural esteem for academic credentials.

Example: The European Institute for Climate and Energy (EIKE) presents itself as a respected scientific institution in Austria to spread scientifically discredited claims.

EIKE has built a loyal audience, and its articles are widely shared within that community. One recent post, shared by user “A_nicht_nichtA,” falsely claimed that Antarctic and Arctic sea ice are expanding rather than melting.

In Germany, prominent climate-denier, economist Stefan Homburg lists himself as a professor at the University of Hannover. While he once held that position, he retired early after drifting toward conspiracy theories. Homburg actively replies to posts on X, especially those requesting Grok’s information. In addition, he uses hashtags such as #chemtrails and #klima frequently in his posts.

Why people believe it: Institutional camouflage and reputational legitimacy

This narrative operates through a sophisticated act of institutional camouflage. It exploits the public’s entirely reasonable deference to academic credentials and their general inability to vet obscure scientific bodies.

The creation of an “Expert Front” like EIKE or the strategic use of an academic title (e.g., Stefan Homburg’s retired professorship) instantly lends legitimacy to unscientific claims.

For the audience, the effortless appearance of authority, a clean website, and a professor’s name is sufficient proof that the information is trustworthy.

This is compounded by the fact that the actual, nuanced science is often difficult to access. This tactic provides a comforting, simple-to-believe “official” counter-narrative, mobilizing a loyal audience that values the perceived intellectual weight of these manufactured institutions over the consensus of established science.

Countering the narrative: Fact-check credentials

When anyone is speaking from a supposed place of authority, it’s essential to check their status and affiliations as much as possible. This should inform how much weight to give their statements. The situation for verifying a person on social media has become more difficult since verification badges became a paid-for item, but institutions may also indicate affiliated experts on their official pages.

For institutions in the age of misinformation, it has become more important to clearly distance themselves from people who are seen to be misusing past titles or completely falsifying any affiliation.

Meanwhile, EIKE is known for spreading unscientific denial claims. With a professional-looking name and website, a newcomer may not recognize that EIKE is not a legitimate scientific body. However, there is media reporting going back years and publicly-available information about it and other similar outfits, so viewers should aim to double-check any credentials, particularly when the topic is scientific or related to a specialism.

Conclusion

From weaponizing legitimate concerns over logistics in Belém to exploiting energy anxiety with false blackout narratives, there is no shortage of localized, fear-based content that delays systemic change until it is ecologically and economically too late.

By anticipating the next line of attack—whether it’s the cost of net zero, the ‘hypocrisy’ of climate leaders, or the perceived threat to national sovereignty—the international community can build public resilience, secure the mandate for the Just Transition and climate finance at COP30, and ensure that the vital work of staying below the +1.5°C threshold is not derailed by strategic, funded falsehoods.

The future of climate policy hinges not just on scientific consensus, but on our collective ability to safeguard the integrity of the conversation.

Eurovision News Spotlight will be monitoring the disinformation landscape during COP30.

Further reading as part of this investigation

• ORF: Climate Change: New tactics of disinformation

• Yle: Climate lies have changed, but not disappeared – these kinds of claims about climate change are now spreading on social media

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The modern battlefield for the State of Israel isn't confined to its physical boundaries; it extends to the screens and social media feeds of a global audience. An open source investigation of Israeli government advisories, committee minutes, and procurement documents by members of Eurovision News Spotlight reveals a sophisticated, well-funded, and often unconventional public relations strategy. This effort, known as hasbara or public diplomacy, is specifically aimed at shaping the international narrative around the country’s military operations.

These documents, spanning from 2018 to as recently as July 2025, detail a systematic effort by the Prime Minister’s Office and other Israeli government ministries to harness major digital and television platforms to counter what they perceive as a “hostile media environment.” The core of this operation is a centralised, agile, and at times, opaque procurement system that prioritises urgency and "special trust" over standard competitive bidding for government contracts.

At the centre of this online offensive is the Israeli Government Advertising Agency (IGAA), a state-run bureau known as Lapam, which is using the advertising platforms of Google and Meta to promote Israeli government narratives and counter those who directly challenge Tel Aviv's policies and military operations through paid advertising.

These campaigns rely on emotionally charged, debunked narratives that are meticulously planned and executed, such as paid-for ads showing bustling Gaza markets to counter reports of famine, campaigns labelling the UN Special Rapporteur as an “anti-Semite,” and advertisements that accuse the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) of being a "front for Hamas."

According to the Google Ads Transparency Center, in 2024, Lapam sponsored 2,000 ads, 900 of which were aimed at the domestic population, while 1,100 targeted international audiences in selected countries.

In contrast, from January 1 to September 5, 2025, Lapam had published more than 4,000 advertisements, 50% percent of which had been targeted at international audiences.

This report documents a strategic information operation that utilises government communication and wartime propaganda. The investigation reveals that the Israeli government's hasbara apparatus is not solely focused on presenting its perspective but on actively constructing a narrative to counter on-the-ground realities. This goal is achieved through a systematic network of contracts and a concentrated effort to influence the global conversation.

Part I: The tale of two Gazas

There are two distinct and competing realities of Gaza: the one presented by international reports, which documents a population suffering from famine, and the other, a manufactured narrative portrayed through government-sponsored media that shows a semblance of normalcy.

Famine was officially declared in Gaza Governorate in an August report by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), the world's leading hunger monitor backed by the United Nations.

International reports and first-hand journalistic accounts describe a population suffering from the effects of a protracted conflict and a crippling blockade, which saw food, medicine, fuel, and other humanitarian supplies prevented from entering the territory since March.

Israel continues to refute the famine classification and the IPC report in its entirety, launching a government-sponsored media campaign portraying a semblance of normalcy within the besieged enclave.

Dozens of ads published by the Israeli state's advertising arm and placed across platforms like Google, YouTube, Teads/Outbrain, and X show bustling markets and restaurants in Gaza, intentionally creating a reality that conflicts with the IPC's findings, and promote a single message: "There is food in Gaza."

However, a closer examination of the reality on the ground, as reported by journalists, reveals the limitations of this narrative.

David Kriegleder, Israel correspondent for Austrian public service broadcaster Österreichische Rundfunk (ORF), said that he has repeatedly heard from contacts in Gaza that the food supply is much better in some areas like Rafah, Khan Younis, and Al-Mawasi, while supplies are much more limited in the northern areas, and that this is due to the aid supply mainly entering via southern border crossings.

The presence of food in certain markets says nothing about the overall situation, he said, adding: “The Gaza Strip is a patchwork when it comes to the supply situation, military escalation, and accessibility for aid trucks”.

“It's possible that four bakeries in Khan Younis have received flour and are making the finest pastries, while five kilometres away, nothing is getting through at all.”

Palestinian fact-checker Riham Abu Aita recently ran several in-person training courses in Gaza, and described high food prices and even an inability to find goods to feed to trainees, saying that “not all areas in Gaza are suffering the same”.

At the time of this report's publication, a Lapam-sponsored advertisement campaign encouraged readers to examine the "flaws and inconsistencies" in the IPC report that declared a famine in Gaza. This advertisement was strategically placed directly above the Google search results for the report itself, seemingly aiming to influence the first impression of users searching for information on the topic and direct them to an Israeli government website.

According to the Google Ad Transparency Center, this advertisement was visible across various European countries, including Belgium, the UK, Denmark, Sweden, and Germany.

When contacted for this report, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded via the country's embassy in Berlin and did not offer a new comment, but instead referred our reporters to two X posts by the Ministry.

The first described the IPC report as "fabricated ... to fit Hamas’s fake campaign".

The other, by ministry spokesperson Oren Marmorstein, referenced a resolution by the International Association of Genocide Scholars, which accused Israel of committing genocide in Gaza. Marmorstein said that it was "an embarrassment to the legal profession and to any academic standard" and added: "It is entirely based on Hamas’s campaign of lies and the laundering of those lies by others."

The embassy also attached a scanned letter which was sent by the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the IPC after the declaration of famine. It listed a series of claims referring to flaws in the research for famine classification.

In response to the letter, the IPC released a new document addressing the claims and defending the famine analysis. The IPC’s assessment of the situation in Gaza used a methodology that was previously used in Sudan in 2024 and South Sudan in 2020—a simplified data collection method that is explicitly permitted in war and crisis zones under IPC guidelines—and that standard was not changed or lowered for Gaza.

International journalists are banned from reporting independently from Gaza, with media tours offered by the Israeli military heavily controlled. The IDF-embedded tours inside Gaza, which has seen influencers and international journalists brought on visits to view specific sites mainly related to the aid work of Israel, are currently the only way international reporters can get inside Gaza. This is despite the world's largest media organisations and alliances—including the European Broadcasting Union—demanding that international reporters be allowed into the enclave to report freely on the conflict.

David Kriegleder described one such controlled media visit to a logistics hub in Gaza on August 21, while embedded with the Israeli army, which he characterised as a clear hasbara effort.

"The purpose of the visit was to show us that there were aid supplies stored there, that the Israeli army was allowing enough to enter, and that the problem was international aid organisations and the UN not picking them up in time. So, this was the 'hasbara' idea behind the trip," Kriegleder said.

He explained that the tour was carefully managed to promote a specific narrative—that Israel wasn't responsible for the humanitarian crisis—and to prevent journalists from seeing the full picture.

"We had been promised that we would drive up to 10 kilometres into Gaza and possibly visit one of the controversial GHF (Gaza Humanitarian Foundation) distribution points. That did not happen. We drove only about 6-7 minutes onto the Gaza side of Kerem Shalom, where there is a relatively large logistics hub. We were then taken to a storage area, or more accurately, an expanded parking lot," he said.

The UN contends that the primary reason aid supplies are not being distributed is not a lack of effort on its part, but a severe bottleneck at the border. The number of trucks permitted to enter Gaza is a small fraction of what is needed, and the UN and other aid agencies have repeatedly cited “bureaucratic, logistical, administrative and other operational obstacles", including arbitrary restrictions on essential supplies.

This creates a critical contradiction: while the Israeli campaign suggests an abundance of food, the UN points to a deliberate system of access denials that starves the humanitarian pipeline at its source.

Kriegleder also believes much of Israel's current hasbara efforts are directed at the American audience and, in particular, the White House. While Donald Trump is still supporting Israel in the Gaza campaign, he has expressed disgust at the pictures of starving children.

"The timing is rather a late realisation that the Israeli view also needs to be better propagated and communicated," Kriegleder said.

In February, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a public tender seeking a private firm to provide professional consulting services to assist the government in bringing 10,000 visitors to Israel in 2025 as part of its "public diplomacy" and public relations efforts.

"The visitors will come from a wide array of fields, including culture, art, technology, economics, security, government, academia, education, tourism, and more," the official document from the MFA said.

The supplier was expected to help the ministry achieve its public diplomacy goals, improve foreign relations, and strengthen ties with "opinion leaders", and to also assist with post-visit follow-up and feedback to help Israeli missions abroad manage ongoing relationships and improve Israel's image globally.

The Israeli government has also courted pro-Trump MAGA influencers in a bid to boost support among Republicans who are increasingly divided over support for the war. In August, 15 high-profile influencers visited Israel on a trip organised by Israel365, an advocacy group that was awarded a no-bid contract worth $70,000 by the Israeli Foreign Ministry to organise the trip, Axios reported.

One of those on the trip, Jayne Zirkle, posted extensively about being on the "MAGA influencers" trip to Israel through Israel365, which included a visit to the occupied Golan Heights, the West Bank, and areas affected by the Hamas-led October 7 attack.

Other American personalities, including pro-Trump influencer Xaviaer DuRousseau, travelled inside Gaza in August. DuRousseau filmed himself in front of boxes of aid and said: "If I were Israel I wouldn't even provide matching socks to Gaza, but here's all the aid that y'all claim doesn't exist."

Pro-Israel media personality Brooke Goldstein, posting after an IDF-embed visit to view the work of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, said "what I saw proved that what the media is reporting about the situation is absolutely false"—despite a famine being declared three months into the GHF's operation.

Part II: Distribution through Israel's Foreign Affairs Ministry YouTube channel

On the surface, Israel's Foreign Affairs Ministry YouTube channel appears to be a conventional extension of state communication. It is a verified account that publishes press statements, cultural programming, and diplomatic messaging. With over 1,072 videos, nearly 100,000 subscribers, and activity dating back to December 2008, the channel presents itself as a tool of digital diplomacy—projecting Israel's image globally, well beyond the reach of traditional embassies and press offices.

However, beneath its official branding, the channel's activities reveal a deeper reality. It does not appear to be designed for steady audience growth or cultural exchange but rather for strategic bursts of visibility, financed directly through paid advertising campaigns. By opting out of monetisation, the ministry signals that its goal is not profit but influence. In fact, money flows in the opposite direction: instead of earning revenue, Israel pays Google to amplify its content.

In December 2024, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar announced that his ministry would receive an additional $150 million (€128.3 million) on top of its existing budget for ongoing activities related to "public diplomacy." Sa'ar and his New Hope party agreed to rejoin Netanyahu's coalition in November in exchange for this funding and Sa'ar's appointment as foreign minister. At the time of the coalition agreement, Sa'ar indicated that the funding would be used to influence public sentiment in the foreign press and on social media.

In a statement announcing the increase, Sa'ar said: "Israeli advocacy and the battle for public perception have not received the necessary resources and tools for decades for this campaign, which is critical and life-saving. I am determined to change this. Therefore, I insisted that a significant dedicated budget of 545 million Shekels be added to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ budget, designated for Israeli advocacy. I believe that every shekel allocated to this purpose is an investment, not an expense, and it will strengthen Israel and its standing in the world."

The channel makes use of tags, which help YouTube's algorithm understand its content, and this can influence where a channel's videos are displayed and to whom they are recommended. The channel uses tags such as "Israel", "humanitarian", "aid", "Palestine", "Palestinians", and "digitaldiplomacy".

Engagement spikes: Gaza as a paid campaign

On the same day that the initial IPC assessment was published, Lapam launched a new ad campaign featuring videos of food-filled markets and operational restaurants within the enclave.

Hosted on the Israeli Foreign Ministry YouTube channel, the videos included onscreen text and an AI-generated voiceover, concluding with the phrase: "There is food in Gaza. Any other claim is a lie." The restaurant videos were uploaded in multiple languages, including English, German, Italian, and Polish, while the market videos were posted in English, German, and Italian.

As part of this investigation, BR24, ORF, DW and VRT published detailed fact-checks on the content of the ads, which were misleading in their claim that food is plentiful in the Gaza Strip.

Footage shared by the Israeli Foreign Ministry on August 21 claims to show restaurants serving food to customers in July 2025. The video has been viewed more than six million times since its publication.

The multilingual rollout suggests that audience segmentation was intentional, aimed at influencing European and global perceptions of Gaza during a politically sensitive period. The seven videos were used as ads before YouTube videos and across Google products in Germany, Austria, the UK, Italy, and the U.S., and received a combined view count of close to 19 million.

Generally, these videos were reused multiple times for renewed paid ads between August 22 and the end of the month. Between August 5 and September 2, 2025, the account garnered over 30 million views in total.

Daily performance data from August 2025 shows significant traffic surges that coincide with the release of the videos about Gaza's restaurants and food markets.

These were not organic hits. Analysis from Social Blade and platform tracking confirm that the videos were distributed through Google Ads, indicating that the Foreign Ministry deliberately paid to insert them into users’ feeds across multiple countries.

By early September, traffic collapsed, with some days showing negative views (–24,000 views on September 2). This reflects YouTube's purging of inflated or spam traffic, which is a common occurrence in large-scale ad campaigns.

Subscriber growth was modest: from 97,000 in early August to 99,300 by the end of the month, before plateauing. Despite millions of paid impressions, the campaign did not result in meaningful long-term audience growth.

This strategy carries far-reaching implications. By showcasing Gaza's restaurants and food markets, the ministry attempted to reframe the territory’s image from one of crisis to one of normalcy. YouTube and Google Ads have been the intermediaries and vehicles for delivering this content directly to the public. Without these globally dominant platforms and services, this level of exposure would be near impossible to achieve.

Examination of the Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry's YouTube channel and subsequent statistics reveal that it operates as a state-sponsored advertising platform, flaring into prominence whenever political messaging is required and then fading into silence until the next campaign.

Part III: The strategy of hasbara

The documents outline a comprehensive communications strategy that adapts to both domestic and international needs.

At home, a cornerstone of this strategy is the "Daka LeShemona" (Minute to Eight) television segment. The segment, which is broadcast across all major Israeli channels directly before the evening news, is considered the most effective medium for delivering high-impact messaging. These one-minute TV segments are commissioned under exemption or tender, and cover topics including hasbara government communications.

Government documents repeatedly cite its "high viewership", "attention levels", and "effective messaging" as justification for its use. The unique nature of "Daka LeShemona" has allowed a single company, Grey Content Ltd., to become an indispensable partner for the government, as the company holds the exclusive rights to the slots. Some of the campaigns awarded to and carried out by Grey Content Ltd include:

The documents note that the production costs are typically less than 25% of the total contract value, a figure consistent with Lapam policy.

In each of these cases, the rationale provided by Lapam is the same: Grey Content's exclusive rights make it "impossible" to consider other options. Lapam also consistently approves the production component of the contracts, which is typically capped at less than 25% of the total value and less than 15% of the media cost, a policy decision that gives Grey Content a de-facto monopoly on both the airtime and the content.

This reliance on Grey Content is part of a broader trend in Israeli government contracting. These tenders and exemptions emphasise quality over price and require specific experience, notably security clearance. Government spending on public relations and information campaigns often uses emergency declarations and unique relationships to circumvent the public tender process. The documents show that even when the government is directed to find long-term solutions, it often continues to rely on these pre-existing, sole-source arrangements.

The Legal challenge

In August 2024, the Israeli advertising agency McCann Tel Aviv Ltd. filed a petition against the Israeli Prime Minister's Office, Lapam and Grey Content Ltd., along with a request for an interim injunction, against seven contracts awarded to Grey Content Ltd. between July 25, 2024, and July 28, 2024. These decisions, according to the petition, involved engagements granted with an exemption from tender for various advertising campaigns.

McCann Tel Aviv Ltd. requested that the court order the cancellation of these decisions, citing reasons such as damage to its rights and violation of tender laws, and the legitimacy of the "urgent" reasoning for the awarding of the exemption.

The court ultimately ruled against McCann Tel Aviv Ltd, saying it is ruling that the different campaign production had already begun, involving significant public funds, and halting it would cause substantial damage.

Despite the court's decision, the case indicates that other major advertising and media firms are challenging the legality of these direct, no-bid contracts.

The spokesperson cadre: ‘Special trust’

For foreign media, the documents highlight an urgent need for a cadre of professional spokespeople, or Masbiranim. A publication from September 2024 detailed the engagement of eight English and Farsi-speaking spokespeople. This was done via a tender exemption, with the National Public Diplomacy Directorate citing an "urgent need to prevent significant damage to Israel's public relations efforts on the global stage."

The documents explicitly state that the "lack of spokespersons... causes significant damage to the effort to preserve the legitimacy of Israel's actions," arguing that the failure to counter competing narratives in the international arena was a severe detriment.

The contracts for these services were not awarded through a public bidding process. Instead, they were justified by Regulation 5(a)(2)—which allows for an exemption from a tender process for work requiring "special trust relationships".

The documents state that a key figure like Israeli government spokesman David Mencer, for example, possesses a "deep knowledge" of the issues and a "proven ability to convey sensitive messages accurately".

An evolving, high-value contract

Mencer was among a group of eight "public diplomacy specialists" identified by the government to fulfil contracts as a temporary measure during the “Iron Swords War,” the name given by Israel to its military operation in Gaza that began in response to the Hamas-led attacks on October 7, 2023.

The initial contract, approved in September 2024, was set for up to six months and had a total value of up to 1,000,000 Shekels (approximately €256,000) for all eight consultants. Due to various issues, including insurance difficulties, Mencer's contract was the only one ultimately executed from this initial group, the documents show.

A subsequent extension was approved in May 2025, for up to one year, or until a maximum budget of 127,118 Shekels (€32,600) was reached. The hourly rate was set at 285 Shekels (€73), with a monthly cap of 80 hours.

A more significant shift occurred a month later, when the contract was reclassified to be under Regulation 5(a)(2), with the Prime Minister's Office justifying this change by citing the "deep trust" that had developed between the Prime Minister and Mencer, as well as his "unique expertise" and long experience in communications.

This new contract, which superseded the previous agreement, increased the potential monthly work hours to 180 and raised the total value to up to 615,600 Shekels (approximately €157,700) for a period of up to one year, with payment based on actual hours worked.

Despite directives from the exemption committee to find a more permanent, long-term solution, the PMO approved the extension based on the premise that an urgent need still existed for his specific skills.

Mr. Mencer did not respond to requests for comment on this investigation.

Part IV: Procurement as a weapon

The procurement process itself is a key part of the story, revealing the strategic mindset of the government. Committee approvals from various ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, and Ministry of Tourism, demonstrate a consistent pattern of bypassing or extending standard procedures. The justifications for these tender exemptions are varied but recurring.

The "Iron Swords War" is cited in dozens of documents to justify immediate, non-tendered procurements. The Ministry of Health, for example, rapidly engaged Graphos Print Ltd. to produce roll-ups for displaced persons, escalating a minor contract from 19,824 Shekels (€5,000) to over 79,000 Shekels (€20,000) in a matter of days due to the "urgent need."

In June, an Israeli Exemption Committee approved an application by Lapam to engage with Google, X, and French and Israeli advertising platforms Outbrain/Teads, to run public information campaigns worth 167 million Shekels (€42.8 million), according to the translated official document.

The approved contracts, set to run from June 17 until December 31, 2025, saw 150 million Shekels (approximately €38.5 million) allocated to YouTube and Google's advertising campaign management platform, Display & Video 360, while a further 10 million Shekels (€2.56 million) was approved for campaigns on X. French and Israeli advertising platforms Outbrain/Teads were slated to receive seven million Shekels (€1.79 million).

"The request is for campaigns related to 'Operation Rising Lion' (Israel's military offensive in Iran) as well as ongoing activities. The committee was told that these are specific engagements with each company to purchase ‘airtime’ for government advertising, based on L'PAM's price lists," the document states.

As with Grey Content Ltd., direct engagements have been made with exclusive service providers, such as WOCHIT, an Israeli-founded cloud-based video creation platform that enables users to produce high-quality videos in over 20 languages.

Several documents detail the exercise of “options for extension” with existing suppliers to maintain service continuity while a new tender process is underway. This practice, while regulated, shows a clear preference for proven relationships over a new, potentially disruptive, competitive process.

Part V: Targeting critics and countering narratives

The documents show that the hasbara efforts are not only about promoting a positive image, but also about actively discrediting and undermining critics. The government of Israel has long utilised its advertising agency to fund paid international campaigns aimed at European and North American audiences.

For over a year, government-funded ads have appeared as top search results for "UNRWA," directing users to a government website that accuses the agency of being a "front for Hamas." These ads, with slogans like "Paychecks for terrorists or humanitarian aid?", have been denounced by the UN as "hate speech" and "disinformation."

The UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Francesca Albanese, has been the subject of a months-long counter-campaign. Paid-for ads across Europe have accused her of being an "anti-Semite" for her public criticism of Israeli policies. Google's mislabelling of these ads under mild categories like "Family and Community" has, in some cases, helped them bypass political advertising restrictions.

Tommaso Canetta, Fact-checking Coordinator at the European Digital Media Observatory, noted that maintaining the support of Europe and the United States is a key priority for the Israeli government as it tries to stave off the type of international isolation South Africa faced near the end of the Apartheid era.

"I think the general idea behind the Israeli propaganda and disinformation is to win the sympathy of the Western public opinions in Europe, of course, also in the United States. Israel is now facing an unprecedented risk of isolation from the international community...This is a clearly a strategic interest for them. The war, you can fight it in the field, but also in the information ecosystem. And in the information ecosystem, their strategic goal is not to be isolated, not to lose the support of the Western of the European public opinions."

Oren Persico, an Israeli journalist at investigative outlet The Seventh Eye, said a focus on overly specific cases, such as a restaurant open in Gaza or food at a market filmed on one day, is a method to move attention away from the bigger picture.

Persico said the planting of government "spin and messages" abroad is part of the Israeli strategy, in part because it doesn't need to do much narrative-building at home.

"Abroad, in France, Germany, wherever, they would show, I presume, what's going on in Gaza, and maybe a comment or a response from the Israeli government at the end. The main thing wouldn't be the narrative of the Israeli government. And so Israel does try to spread its hasbara through YouTube channels or Facebook, Twitter, whatever. In Israel, you don't really need that."

Hasbara, a Hebrew word meaning 'explanation' that is most often used to describe the communications strategy for the state narrative, is actually a topic of much discourse in Israel, according to Persico.

“One of the main talking points in Israel these days is the lack of effective Israeli hasbara. Somehow, the Israelis believe that if only they could put their message out, the world would understand that we are the victims. And if you look at the history of Israeli hasbara, you see that after every atrocity this sort of public discussion re-emerges. 'Why don't we have enough funding? Why don't we have enough people working on hasbara?'“

The stakes of the digital battlefield

The documents lay bare the full extent of a strategic, well-funded, and deeply integrated information operation. By leveraging the legal flexibility of its procurement system and the technological reach of global digital platforms, Israel has created an agile apparatus for public diplomacy.

It is not the only side of this conflict using pictures to portray a certain image of the situation. Although less frequent in its media releases, Hamas has published videos online, including two clips showing a starving hostage. These propaganda efforts are far less wide-reaching and effective, as online channels for Hamas are blocked in much of Europe under terrorism laws, and in many cases can only be seen via news reporting on the videos or third party reshares on social media.

Eurovision News Spotlight contacted Google on two occasions for comment regarding its policies surrounding misinformation and advertising standards, safeguards against the proliferation of state-generated propaganda, and the substantial amount of money being spent by the Israeli government on advertising on the platform. Google failed to respond to both requests.

Israel's strategy highlights the vulnerability of the international public to emotionally persuasive narratives and the challenges faced by fact-checkers and traditional journalists in countering them.

As Tommaso Canetta noted, Israel’s goal is to avert international isolation and "win the sympathy of Western public opinions".

The battle for hearts and minds is now a key part of modern conflict. The documents show that Israel has chosen to wage this war on the digital front, using sponsored ads as a powerful tool in its arsenal. And in this new digital arena, the cost of the campaign, measured in millions of shekels, is considered a necessary expense for national security.

Reporting by Max Gilbert (BR24), Michael Schlegel (BR24), Jana Heigl (BR24), Eva Wackenreuther (ORF defacto), Kathrin Wesolowski (Deutsche Welle), Alima de Graaf (Deutsche Welle), Daan Nicolay (VRT), Maria Flannery (EBU) and Derek Bowler (EBU) for Eurovision News Spotlight.

Further reading as part of this investigation:

• BR24: How Israel's government deliberately sows doubts about famine in Gaza

• ORF: Israel downplays the emergency in Gaza

• Deutsche Welle: Israel spends vast sums on propaganda ads

• VRT: Israel pays millions to Google for YouTube ads denying famine in Gaza

• RTVE: Israel pays for a multi-million dollar Google ad campaign to deny the famine in Gaza

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Across Europe, a palpable shift in public sentiment is underway, marked by growing unease and, in some cases, outright hostility towards migrants and asylum seekers. This rise in anti-migrant sentiment isn't monolithic; instead, it's a complex interplay of socioeconomic anxieties, localised grievances, and the widespread dissemination of misinformation.

Recent data underscores this trend. A YouGov poll spanning Germany, Spain, Sweden, Britain, Italy, France, and Denmark revealed that a majority of respondents in all surveyed countries felt immigration over the past decade had been excessive and largely negative for their nations. It's crucial, however, not to conflate these concerns with an endorsement of hate or violence against migrants.

Yet, Europe is witnessing an increasing number of flashpoints. From violent protests in England to incidents of rioting and arson in Ireland and Spain, fuelled by local tensions, the landscape is volatile. What distinguishes this current wave from previous periods is a more mainstream acceptance of extremist narratives, the sophisticated coordination of anti-migrant efforts, and the almost instantaneous global amplification of localised incidents through digital platforms. Influential social media accounts, such as Italy's @RadioGenoa with its 1.4 million followers on X, exemplify this. These accounts systematically spread false and misleading narratives, effectively transforming fear into widespread animosity.

Economic pressures, perceived strains on public services, and cultural anxieties often lay the groundwork for local frustrations. These frustrations can then be directed into anti-migrant sentiments, particularly following specific incidents. Local events, whether a protest against a hotel housing asylum seekers or a riot fuelled by rumours, are often amplified and distorted through social media.

As influential voices exploit these narratives, decontextualised or false claims gain exponential traction, transforming fear into widespread animosity and challenging authorities grappling with an increasingly volatile landscape. This growing momentum threatens to ignite further unrest, making the management of migration not only a humanitarian challenge but also a critical test for social cohesion and political stability across Europe.

Epping erupts: Town is latest 'battleground for extremist agendas' in movement led by Tommy Robinson

A town in Essex called Epping was the scene for the latest in a long line of violent anti-migrant protests in Britain, when tensions erupted earlier this month near a hotel housing asylum seekers.

It began as a series of peaceful protests by local people calling for the closure of The Bell Hotel, sparked by the arrest of a 38-year-old migrant called Hadush Kebatu, who was later charged on suspicion of alleged sexual assaults in the town. The Ethiopian had only arrived in the UK on a boat eight days before an alleged incident involving a young girl.

However, things descended into chaos when a more extreme element took to the streets of Epping. The protests took a violent turn, which was dubbed "hooliganism" by the local Essex Police. Eight police officers were injured on Thursday, July 17, when demonstrators hurled bottles and eggs at the force and damaged their vehicles. Southend Magistrates' Court heard officers came under "sustained attacks for over four hours".

More protests followed, and the number of people arrested, just a little more than a week later, had reached 23. Chief Superintendent Simon Anslow stated that the cost of policing the incidents had reached £100,000 in just one week. Police "had missiles thrown at them and they've been injured," the Chief Supt said, adding: "To those who seek to use social media to peddle untruths and lies about the incidents in Epping on Thursday and Sunday, you won't win."

As far-right agitators from outside hijacked the town's peaceful protest by people with legitimate concerns, an information war was already waging online. Anti-migrant protesters near the hotel reported witnessing the police accompanying a 'refugees welcome' demonstration into the fray, further entrenching the anti-migrant side's suspicion of authorities and leading to calls of a cover-up about police protecting the counter-protesters. Nigel Farage, leader of the Reform Party, called for the head of Essex Police to resign over the allegations. However, it is normal for police to form lines between groups where there could be high tensions.

In a press conference, Chief Constable BJ Harrington denied that police were taking a side, saying: "The only protection that officers are doing is to those lawful and law-abiding people, whether they're in that accommodation, whether they're the people of Epping, or whether they are people who are standing there with placards and banners wishing to make a very important and legitimate view—whichever your views about it. Where officers have intervened, that's because there has been disorder, there have been threats, or there has been the fear and concerns of those threats ... we're not being partial in any way, shape or form."

As discourse around migration and Epping was fanned online, news reporters on the ground said they noticed local protesters repeating some of the far-right talking points about the situation.

It's not the first time The Bell Hotel in Epping has been the subject of disgruntlement, and tensions around it have been building up for years. In 2020, a local councillor said in a YouTube video that food donated to a charity for residents in need was being "diverted" to the hotel to feed asylum seekers, and added unsubstantiated claims about an increase in petty crimes in the area. The video was reported to the police by other councillors in the district and by the charity's director. Pesh Kapasiawala of 3Food4U said at the time that it was "fake news" and that no items donated to it were going to the Bell Hotel (which is part of a state system to house and feed asylum seekers as they wait to be processed).

Late last week, the local council voted unanimously to urge the government to shut down the hotel. Even councillors who were opposed to the violent fringe said they were concerned that the peaceful local demonstrations were being "infiltrated" by those with extreme views. Local Conservative leader Chris Whitbread said: "I'm worried that Epping will become a focus and a battleground for the agendas of those extremist groups and they will continue to stoke tensions as part of their wider campaigns."

Britain's most influential far-right figure, Tommy Robinson—whose real name is Stephen Yaxley-Lennon—was championing the recent Epping protests. The former football hooligan is one of the loudest anti-Islam voices in Europe and has over a million followers on X. His star rose during Brexit, and investigations over the years have linked him to international far-right networks and questioned his ties to Russia.

Robinson is the celebrity ringleader of British nationalists; when he calls on his followers to descend on a town or neighbourhood to add to the numbers of local protesters, they go—sometimes with devastating results. Merseyside Police specifically blamed supporters of the English Defence League, a now-defunct organisation founded by Robinson, for inflaming the 2024 riot in Southport that erupted after a mass stabbing at a children's dance class. The UK's former counter-terrorism police chief, Neil Basu, also accused Nigel Farage of inciting violence, after the prominent political figure questioned "whether the truth is being withheld from us" after the attack.

The unrest in Southport spread to other UK cities. It was fanned by false claims about the identity and religious background of the attacker—a minor who couldn't yet be named—leading rioters to burn mosques and carry out attacks on immigrants' homes and businesses. The Southport attacker turned out to be a British-born, non-Muslim teenager.

Outside of the high-profile disorder, anti-immigrant sentiment in Britain— simmering for at least a decade—has made attacks on refugee accommodation a regular occurrence. When a man drove into a crowd at a Liverpool football parade in May 2025, the local police issued rare details about the attacker within two hours in a bid to quell rumours: namely, that he was a white British man. Momentum is only growing for those willing to travel across the country to increasingly volatile protests, as authorities grapple with how to quench the powder keg that threatens to explode the next time a crime is linked, truthfully or otherwise, to a non-native Briton.

Northern Ireland: Anti-migrant sentiment ushers in new frontier of violence

It started with an alleged sexual assault, and it ended with immigrant families fleeing their homes to be sheltered at other locations.

That was the situation in Northern Ireland in June when widespread rioting broke out and left people from the immigrant community in Ballymena living in fear.

As in other cases, the beginnings were a peaceful protest, arranged for Monday, June 9, in the aftermath of an alleged sexual assault of a teenage girl in the northern town of Ballymena two nights earlier.

On June 8, in its statement announcing the arrests of two people, the speculation had already reached such a level that the Police Service of Northern Ireland asked people "not to speculate or share information on social media – this is not helpful towards the ongoing investigation".

Little was known about the suspects who appeared in court on charges of attempted oral rape. As they were just 14 years old, they weren't named, but it was reported that they were Romanian speakers who required an interpreter for the legal proceedings.

That detail alone was enough to ignite the fuse. Almost a week of widespread chaos followed, seeing cars burnt out, homes damaged, and a spread to other towns in Northern Ireland.

Members of the immigrant community appeared on the news in a state of distress after their houses and cars were ransacked or burnt out. On social media platforms, including Facebook, people shared information about the addresses where immigrants were known to reside.

Some social media activity showed an apparent focus on members of the Roma community, but the ultimate violence that ensued still affected a sweeping array of immigrants. A Ukrainian woman was shouted at by a passing driver while being interviewed for Irish broadcaster RTÉ, and a family originally from the Philippines told reporters they had fled their home after men started banging on the windows during the night and smashed their car.

One of the family, Michael Sancio, said the masked men told him they were not targeting Filipino people. The town has a relatively large Filipino population, with members working locally, including in the health sector, and images began circulating during the crisis of 'Filipino lives here' stickers on doors showing the British and Filipino flags—an attempt by residents to show they were not Romanian and shouldn't be targeted.

Ballymena is a predominantly unionist town in Northern Ireland that has historically seen more sectarian violence between Irish Catholic and Loyalist Protestant communities than it has racial tensions.

Proponents of the recent protests painted a scene of being overrun or 'invaded' by immigrants, echoing the familiar refrain of such groups internationally who believe Europeans will be replaced in their countries by foreigners.

However, widespread immigration across Northern Ireland is still relatively new compared to other parts of the UK, given that the peace deal that essentially ended the decades-long conflict in the territory is not even 30 years old. While immigrants are arriving, almost as many people are emigrating, resulting in an annual net migration of around the low thousands, according to the latest figures.

The 2021 census in Northern Ireland showed that just over 6% of the population had been born outside the UK or Ireland. Almost 97% of people described their ethnicity as white.

The unrest hinged on another common belief among those participating in similar movements: that high rates of immigration are creating an unsafe environment for women and girls.

Northern Ireland is widely considered to be one of the most dangerous places in Europe to be a woman, and dozens of women have been killed by men in the last five years alone.

However, many of the more than 40 victims of femicide over the past eight years were local women and girls killed or suspected to have been killed by men they knew, such as partners, exes, or family members. A BBC report from early July said that since 2020, 27 women have been violently killed in Northern Ireland, with the suspects in 20 of the cases being well-known to them. The figure is already out of date, after a woman and her children were killed in a shooting last week.

No official statistics exist for the nationality of offenders in specific crime categories in Northern Ireland, such as sexual offences. UK-wide crime data—some of which only covers England and Wales—would also likely not be representative of the situation in Northern Ireland, given the differing ethnic breakdown of the populations.

The Ballymena riots represented a significant escalation, but it wasn't the first time Northern Ireland had been entangled in violent anti-migrant activity. The region was sucked into the wave of disorder that erupted across the UK in 2024 after the Southport stabbings. In Belfast, immigrant-owned businesses were torched and rioters stamped on a man's head.

Experts and the police agreed to various degrees that in Northern Ireland, there was a loyalist paramilitary element to the disorder in 2024. In 2025, the fresh unrest broke out among the loyalist community again, which traditionally skews politically to the right. (The communities are notably divided on several international affairs as well as domestic ones, such as Irish republicans' support for Palestine versus British loyalists' backing of Israel.)

While unionist bonfires to celebrate the July 12 Orangemen's holiday have, in the past, featured the burning of Irish flags and effigies of Irish political figures, in 2025, one such pyre made headlines internationally for its burning of mannequins representing non-white migrants on board a boat.

In a region that has struggled to shrug off paramilitarism since the Troubles fully—but where peace has finally settled between the local populations—inward migration and the myths around it are threatening to spark the new frontier of violence in Northern Ireland.

Ireland's troubling trend: Anti-migrant violence fuelled by online lies

On Saturday 19 July, an Indian man was violently attacked and partially stripped in the area of Kilnamanagh in south-west Dublin.

The attackers, who reportedly removed the man’s trousers and beat him in the street, also falsely accused him of acting inappropriately around children. While attempting to seek help, the man was allegedly subjected to a second assault, believed to have stemmed from false assumptions about his conduct.

Irish police, An Garda Síochána (AGS), confirmed that the allegations against the victim were unfounded and are treating the incident as a potential hate crime.

Footage of the attack, along with false claims about the victim, spread rapidly online and were amplified by known anti-immigration accounts.

The man, who had arrived in Ireland just three weeks earlier to begin work with a major tech multinational, sustained multiple injuries and was taken to hospital for treatment.

The attack is one of several racially motivated assaults in Ireland, many fuelled by disinformation.

Earlier this month, an Afghan man who is seeking asylum from the Irish State was attacked in the city of Limerick, a day after false accusations were made about him approaching children. Gardaí described the claims as “misinformation and disinformation.”

In another case last year and reported by RTÉ, Nigerian architect Onyema Udeze was attacked in Dublin after being falsely accused of rape. Gardaí said the allegations were unfounded, but they gained considerable traction online.

Statistics

The number of hate crimes recorded by AGS has increased over the past four years, following the introduction of a standardised hate-crime recording system in 2021.

That year, AGS recorded a total of 448 hate crimes and hate-related incidents. That figure rose to 582 in 2022, 651 in 2023, and 676 in 2024—the highest total since the system was introduced. However, AGS say hate-related crime is under-reported in Ireland.

Race has consistently been the most recorded motive for these incidents.

Anti-immigration agitators also spread disinformation by hijacking local incidents to provoke outrage.

In April, a church fire in Co Donegal was falsely blamed on Afghan refugees by an anonymous X account. The claim quickly went viral, despite Gardaí later ruling out any foul play.

This kind of online mobilisation has also been linked to fires at properties either confirmed or rumoured to be linked to the accommodation of people seeking international or temporary protection.

Since November 2018, more than 30 fires have been reported at these sites. The majority of the fires occurred in 2023, with a surge in incidents continuing into the first half of 2024.

For several months, there were no reported arson attacks at such sites until 23 July 2025, when a building in Ballina, Co Mayo, purchased by the local council for social housing, was set alight.

Instantly, prominent anti-migrant accounts on social media falsely claimed the building was intended for asylum seekers.

The pattern in many previous cases was similar. A building was identified—sometimes officially, sometimes only through speculation—as being intended as accommodation for asylum seekers. Details of the building were then circulated on social media and in some cases, the property was targeted.

In one of the most high-profile instances, in July 2024, a series of fires were lit over multiple nights at a site in Coolock, north Dublin.

The fires followed escalating tension after the removal of a protest camp by Gardaí to allow redevelopment of the site to accommodate up to 500 international protection applicants.

Online disinformation fans anti-migrant unrest in Torre-Pacheco after pensioner assault

On July 12, Spain experienced a surge of over 33,000 racist hate messages across social media in just one day. This spike in hateful content followed the assault on Domingo Tomás, a pensioner from Torre-Pacheco, a town near Murcia in southeastern Spain, which occurred three days prior. The attack, carried out by three young men—reportedly of Moroccan descent—was confirmed by both the Spanish Civil Guard and local media. However, the reactions on social media were rooted in disinformation, hoaxes, and distorted content, all used to incite hate against migrants and create social unrest.

The spread of disinformation narratives against migrants in Torre-Pacheco can be traced to three primary sources: a video that allegedly shows an assault on a pensioner, a fake list displaying five portraits of the so-called "suspects" of the crime, and a false press release impersonating the Torre-Pacheco local council.

The day following the assault, three hoaxes went viral on social media. One particular hoax purported to show a "leaked video showing the savage assault" in Torre-Pacheco; however, the clip had no actual connection to Domingo Tomás or his small town in southern Spain.

Despite this, the video gained traction with messages shared by members of a youth organisation affiliated with the Spanish far-right party Vox. The false information continues to spread without repercussions, as there has been no response from Elon Musk's platform or its "Community Notes" feature, making an archive tool unnecessary.

The other fabrication, a fake list claiming to show five "suspects," serves as a case study. In addition to the typical Spanish-speaking social media profiles prone to sharing disinformation, this falsehood was also published by Luis Pérez Alvise, a Spanish member of the European Parliament.

Another hoax that went viral within 48 hours of the assault in Torre-Pacheco was a document presented on social media as a press release from the town council. This fake document, which linked crime to migration, was primarily shared on Telegram channels and by profiles associated with other countries, including the Spanish version of Pravda, which is known for promoting pro-Kremlin disinformation.

Three viral fake messages were shared on social media by Spanish actors affiliated with far-right and racist organisations to incite hate speech against the immigrant population in Torre-Pacheco and create unrest.

On the same day that over 33,000 racist hate messages circulated online, Torre-Pacheco witnessed a demonstration with the slogan "Defend yourself from insecurity".

Debunked or not, the hoaxes and disinformation narratives were used to promote hate speech and calls for a "migrant hunt" in Torre-Pacheco, sparking unrest and attacks on the immigrant population in this town of only 40,000 people.

The three young men allegedly responsible for the assault on Domingo Tomás were arrested in northern Spain while attempting to evade capture. The only individual arrested in connection with the calls for hunting migrants was also on the run, in Barcelona. He was the one in charge of the now-closed Telegram group "Deport Them Now".

Mosque burns in Catalonia amid rising tensions fuelled by misinformation and demographic shifts

While it has avoided the full-blown unrest seen recently in Torre-Pacheco, the Catalan town of Piera (population 14,000) recently faced escalating tensions that culminated in the suspected arson of its local mosque on July 12, 2025.

This incident, currently under investigation by local authorities, highlights the volatile mix of local grievances, unchecked social media narratives, and the opportunistic involvement of far-right groups in a region undergoing significant demographic changes.

The trouble began with a street fight in Piera's town centre, resulting in injuries to three individuals – two minors and an adult, all residing in a local care facility and likely foreign nationals. This detail is often omitted to prevent stigmatisation. In the aftermath, a group of young people from the care facility reportedly confronted the alleged attackers, leading to tense standoffs between "local" and foreign youths.

Despite no further violence, misinformation quickly spread on social media. Baseless claims alleged that foreign minors were "hunting local kids" with weapons. However, both the town council and the police confirmed that they received no complaints and found no evidence of bladed or blunt objects during the unrest. An official statement from the Piera town council aimed to alleviate the situation.

Nevertheless, a video showing police escorting the foreign youths back to their centre was seized upon by far-right entities, including "Barrio Seguro." They criticised the police for supposedly "protecting" foreigners over "local victims." The situation worsened when the care facility itself was attacked with flammable liquid and stones, though thankfully, no injuries were reported.

Amid this rising tide of animosity, the far-right Spanish nationalist party Vox and the openly racist group DESOKUPA took advantage of the unrest, calling for protests. Fortunately, Piera's story differed from that of Torre-Pacheco. The town council and local organisations came together to organise counter-protests that demonstrated solidarity with the Muslim community, effectively preventing a further breakdown of order.

The incident in Piera reflects broader challenges in Catalonia. The region has seen its foreign-born population rise from 1 million to 1.5 million in just a decade, accounting for approximately 18% of the total population of 8 million. This demographic shift, along with socioeconomic factors, has contributed to higher crime rates within this community.

Additionally, Catalonia bears the highest burden of unaccompanied foreign minors in Spain, hosting 64 per 100,000 inhabitants, significantly above the national average of 34.

Such incidents highlight how local events can be amplified and manipulated, revealing deeper societal divides.

Xenophobic protests and misinformation thrive after alleged immigrant crimes in Germany

In Germany, too, alleged crimes by immigrants have fuelled xenophobic protests in the past. The riots in Chemnitz in 2018 are particularly notable. During a stabbing incident on the sidelines of the Chemnitz city festival, Daniel H. was killed.

On the evening of the same day, a spontaneous far-right demonstration occurred in the city. This was sparked by an arrest warrant issued for two men from Iraq and Syria. In the following days, several more demonstrations and marches were organised, primarily by hooligans affiliated with the ‘Pegida’ movement, which was known for its far-right populism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia. The party AfD, which is classified as a suspected far-right extremist organisation, also played a role in these protests.

Eyewitnesses reported attacks on migrants, one of which was documented in a video. However, Hans-Georg Maaßen, the then President of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, questioned the authenticity of these videos and speculated that they might be targeted misinformation. There was no evidence to support Maaßen's claims, and journalists verified that the video was genuine.

An example that is less well-known occurred in Bavaria in 2024. On the social media platform X, a false claim circulated stating that migrants were repeatedly raping children at Ammersee near Munich. The post went viral, leading users to post hateful comments and call for violence and vigilante justice, despite the fact that police and victim support organisations confirmed that no such cases existed.

Experts explain that misinformation was used to bolster an old prejudice: the idea that foreign men are a threat who commit sexual violence. This stereotype has been perpetuated for centuries, even though the vast majority of sexual violence actually occurs within a victim's own family or among their acquaintances.

Hungary's anti-immigrant stance leads to border violence and EU condemnation

In Hungary, the number of refugees is minimal, primarily due to the government's anti-immigration policies, which include a complete closure of the borders, the use of transit zones until 2020, and a dysfunctional asylum system. Between 2020 and 2024, only 261 people applied for refugee status in Hungary, with the application process requiring them to go through consulates in Serbia or Ukraine. Of those applicants, 233 were granted some form of refugee or protected status, with ten of these approvals occurring in 2024.

Since 2015, the ruling Fidesz party has been repeatedly accused of exploiting the refugee crisis to instil fear among the public. In 2022, for example, ahead of the general elections, they claimed that "violence against women in Europe has increased dramatically due to its pro-immigration policies", adding that in some European cities, refugees rape women on the street.

Recently, the government has intensified its defiance of the EU's refugee law, despite facing a daily fine of €1 million. "The number of migrants is zero, and there's no violence," the government stated on Facebook.

Pro-government influencers have echoed the same rhetoric, claiming that refugees have occupied cities in Germany, waged war at the borders of Hungary, and attacked Jewish schools in France. Most of these videos and posts are deliberately misleading and exaggerate the danger posed by the refugees.

In 2015, five human rights NGOs issued a statement urging the government to halt its hateful rhetoric towards refugees, which led to "an increase in extremist manifestations and attacks against asylum seekers and their civilian supporters."

In the same year, there were incidents of violence: a woman suspected of dating a refugee was attacked. Additionally, video footage from that year showed a camerawoman kicking and tripping refugees.

Despite condemnation from the European Courts, Hungarian forces continue violent pushbacks at the borders. The Independent and The Guardian reported the methods used by the border police, including car chases, beatings, and dog attacks.

NGOs continue to report on pushbacks, including those targeting children and older people. One organisation, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, representing victims, has won at least eight cases against Hungarian authorities in Strasbourg.

Hungary's defiance of the EU's refugee policies has drawn condemnation from the European Parliament but has garnered admiration from far-right parties, including Germany's AfD and Spain's Vox. European institutions have struggled to hold Orbán's government accountable for its treatment of refugees, which could encourage similar defiance from other far-right parties across Europe.

Italy's disinformation frontline: The rise and reach of RadioGenoa

At the forefront of the migration crisis, Italy witnessed a subtle but stable influx of disinformation and misleading claims against migrants, perpetuating the larger narrative that paints them as violent, dangerous to society, and ready to "invade" the country.

With Italy registering approximately 9,215 sea arrivals in the first quarter of 2025 alone, this issue has become a critical humanitarian and political concern, making it fertile ground for disinformation on social media, particularly on X (formerly known as Twitter). Here, several accounts have garnered massive followings by systematically spreading false and misleading content against migrants.

Among these, @RadioGenoa, a verified X profile with 1.4 million followers as of July 2025, appears to be one of the most prominent. Its primary use of English is a notable linguistic choice, strongly suggesting an intent to reach a broader, non-Italian-speaking audience across Europe and beyond, maximising its impact.

The account publishes almost exclusively anti-immigrant and racist content and is mainly focused on Europe. Videos and posts published by @RadioGenoa are often baseless or contain false claims and have been roundly debunked by multiple international fact-checkers. For example, in May 2024, @RadioGenoa shared a post falsely claiming that London's mayor, Sadiq Khan, stated in a speech that "The children of Muslims who are underemployed or in jobs not suited to their great skills will have subsidies and I will build housing for those of Islamic faith." Reuters quickly debunked the claim, showing that in his speech, Khan said that "Every Londoner who is on low income or not working will get free training to get the skills for jobs that are created in London."

Contributing to the account's popularity is the fact that its videos are repeatedly republished by prominent public figures, such as Elon Musk (archived here) and Geert Wilders, a Dutch politician and leader of the far-right Party for Freedom, making it a potential European disinformation hub. Wilders, in particular, has shared more messages from @RadioGenoa than any other Dutch MP, consistently amplifying its content to his followers and lending it a crucial, though undeserved, veneer of legitimacy. This phenomenon, which researchers term "trading up the chain," allows decontextualised or outright false videos to gain exponential traction when shared by influential figures, directly transforming manufactured fear into widespread hate.

Beyond specific false claims, RadioGenoa also systematically amplifies racist and xenophobic narratives. In July 2025, the account published several (archived here) posts promoting racial and violent language, commenting on the events in Torre-Pacheco, Spain. On July 12, @RadioGenoa published a video featuring anti-migrants protesters chanting in the streets with the caption "The Spanish in Torre-Pacheco have had enough of Islamic invasion." Within just ten days, this video garnered 975,000 views and 29,000 likes, illustrating the immense reach and impact of its inflammatory rhetoric.

In May 2024, the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) formally flagged @RadioGenoa to X for spreading disinformation about migrants and minorities, but the account has continued its activity on the platform. X's broader stance and action, or lack thereof, on accounts repeatedly flagged for disinformation, particularly those with such a massive reach, remains a critical question.

On July 3, 2024, RadioGenoa published a lengthy post, signed by Antonio Mastantuono, the "creator and administrator" of the page, who explained that the Rome Prosecutor's Office had searched his house and seized his computer, accusing him of spreading hate speech.

Much remains opaque about the background of RadioGenoa and Antonio Mastantuono, including potential funding sources or political affiliations that might motivate its sustained, high-volume disinformation campaign. While investigations have sought to uncover his operations, the outcome of the Rome Prosecutor's Office case against him regarding hate speech charges remains to be fully determined.

Additionally, the origins of RadioGenoa remain uncertain, including whether it is genuinely operating from Italy. However, its influence on the rise of anti-migrant sentiment across Europe and beyond is undeniable.

Reporting by Kate McDonald (RTÉ), Jack McCarron (RTÉ), Borja Diaz-Merry (RTVE), Karen Bauer (BR24), Carlos Baraibar Padró (3CAT), Maria Flannery (EBU), Lili Rutai (EBU), Sara Badilini (EBU) and Derek Bowler (EBU) for Eurovision News Spotlight.

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The Israeli Government Advertising Agency, which serves various government offices, corporations, government-owned companies, and publicly-owned enterprises, placed advertisements across Google products. They also provided instructions on how to vote up to 20 times for the country’s representative in the 2025 contest held in Basel, Switzerland.

Although promoting a country's entry is permitted, social media users have raised concerns that these actions may contravene the spirit of the competition by potentially politicising or instrumentalising the voting process.

Israel’s entrant, Yuval Raphael, finished in second place, as her performance of “New Day Will Rise” received 297 public votes—the highest number of public votes for any act in Saturday’s Grand Final.

Israel ranked 14th after the jury vote, receiving the maximum 12 points from one country, Azerbaijan, which briefly put the Middle Eastern country in the lead. However, Austria ultimately secured enough public votes to overtake Israel and win the title.

The advertisements placed by the Israeli agency garnered millions of views across the internet leading up to Saturday’s final in Basel.

Analysis carried out by Eurovision News Spotlight of a YouTube account created on April 20, 2025 (Archived here), with the username @Vote4NewDayWillRise, published 89 videos between May 6 and May 16, amassing over 8.3 million views on the platform. (See Update 2)

The account features videos of Yuval Raphael speaking in the languages of other participating nations, encouraging people to vote for her entry.

The account, which is listed as being based in Israel, links only to the official voting portal of the Eurovision Song Contest. The channel is not an official account of the Israeli government.

Analysis of the videos on the channel by Eurovision News Spotlight using open-source tools found no evidence of artificial intelligence, indicating that Raphael was directly involved in the video’s creation.

In total, 35 countries were targeted with long and short vertical videos in their native languages. Each video encouraged viewers to “Vote for ‘New Day Will Rise'” and reminded them they could “Vote up to 20 times”.

On May 6, the account published 16 videos targeting 16 European countries to encourage voters to support “#14”, Israel’s designated number in the contest’s semi-final.

Twelve of the 16 countries targeted in the May 6 campaign, including Armenia (Archived here), Czechia (Archived here), Denmark (Archived here), Finland (Archived here), Georgia (Archived here), Greece (Archived here), Latvia (Archived here), Lithuania (Archived here), Luxembourg (Archived here), Malta (Archived here), Montenegro (Archived here), and Serbia (Archived here), competed in the same semi-final as Israel.

Only voters in countries participating in each semi-final could vote on that evening.

On May 16, the day before the Grand Final, the channel published 73 videos targeting 35 countries (Archived here), urging the public to vote for Israel and reminding them to vote for #04, Israel’s designated number for the final.

For the Grand Final, members of the public in all participating countries are allowed to vote, regardless of whether their country’s entry made it through to the last night.

Although the YouTube channel is not officially acknowledged as having any government ties, analysis of the Google Ads Transparency Center (Archived here) confirms that the advertisements were placed by the verified account of the Israeli Government Advertising Agency.

According to Google, a verified advertiser is confirmed by Google after “submitting acceptable documentation, selecting the country that matches the address in the documentation submitted and submitting a name that matches the name in the documentation submitted”.

Google documentation says organisations in Israel may submit two forms of identification, including organisation registration documents and a government-issued photo ID from an authorised representative.

Amplification

Ahead of both the semifinals and Grand Finals, the official social media accounts of the State of Israel amplified the videos across several platforms, including Instagram (Archived here), TikTok (Archived here), and X (Archived here).

Israeli embassies worldwide were also encouraging people to “vote 20 times” for Raphael ahead of both performances, including the embassies of Israel in the United Kingdom (Archived here), Sweden (Archived here), and Denmark (Archived here).

The Eurovision rules explicitly state that the ESC “is a non-political event”, and all participating broadcasters are responsible for ensuring that measures are taken to avoid the contest becoming politicised or “instrumentalised”.

The extensive promotion of Raphael, however, notably omitted any mention of KAN, the Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation, the entity the 24-year-old was representing, indicating the broadcaster was not directly involved in the advertising campaign.

Other entrants also advertised

There were also ad campaigns for other entries this year. Social media users in parts of Europe reported seeing sponsored posts for Malta, Greece, Albania, Poland, Armenia and France, although some of these were run by the artists themselves via their own social platforms, and some were promoted via the competing broadcaster in the territory. In some cases, ads were run weeks ahead of the contest, without a prompt to vote.

Maltese singer Miriana Conte ran a series of ads through her own Meta platforms, as can be seen in the Meta Ad Library. An ad campaign for the Greek entry, Klavdia, was run on Meta platforms by Greek broadcaster ERT, via an official Facebook page the broadcaster has for the song contest.

Physical poster advertisements were seen in Italy for Tommy Cash, the Estonian entry, whose song makes multiple references to Italian culture. The poster showed the ads appeared to have been run by Epic Records Italy, a division of Sony Music. The Spotify listing for the song, ‘Espresso Macchiato’, shows it is under exclusive licence to Sony Music Entertainment Italy S.p.A.

The public vote result

Israel received the highest number of public votes in the competition, losing out only because Austria received far more jury votes, making their overall score higher.

Nineteen countries awarded Israel 10 points or higher in the public vote. Israel received the highest number of points from the televote — 12 points — from Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Cyprus, Czechia, Finland, Ireland, Norway and San Marino gave Israel 10 points from the public vote, the second highest score possible from each country.

Views of adverts displayed in these high-scoring countries totalled more than 4.2 million views at the time of writing.

Despite social media speculation about the public vote, there is no evidence of any issues or irregularities with the result.

A history of advertising by the Israeli government

The inclusion of advertising and promoting the country’s Eurovision Song Contest entrant comes as a departure from the agency’s regular activities of communicating the Israeli government's perspective on the Gaza conflict, its defence policies, and its relationships with international bodies.

The agency describes itself as being “responsible for numerous marketing processes that include public and social campaigns for a wide range of topics”.

Analysis of the Google Ad Transparency Center by the Spotlight team found that the Israeli Government Advertising Agency has run more than 5,000 advertisements, some of which target the credibility of organisations that criticise Israel, counter accusations of wrongdoing, and canvass support for Israel's position on issues such as its military operations in Gaza.

One of the ads paid for by the agency links to an Israeli government website govextra.gov.il, a platform provided by the Israeli government to streamline the creation of its online presence — essentially a mini-website builder for departments of the Israeli government.

The advertisement links to a page titled "Unmasking the Hind Rajab Foundation: A Pseudo-Legal Organisation Masking a Dangerous Agenda (Archived here).

The Hind Rajab Foundation (HRF) is the legal arm of the March 30 Movement, a non-profit organisation established in 2024 and based in Brussels, Belgium.

The organisation has filed several requests for arrests and extradition of Israeli soldiers for alleged "war crimes" in countries across the world, and filed a complaint with the International Criminal Court (ICC) against more than 1,000 Israeli soldiers in October of 2024.

The Israeli website says HRF "presents itself as a legitimate legal advocacy group, dedicated to holding the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) accountable for alleged war crimes," but claims a report by The Israeli Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism "reveals the HRF's deep connections to extremist ideologies and terrorist organisations, raising serious concerns about its true motives."

Another state-sponsored ad (archived here) by the Israeli Government Advertising Agency leads to an Israeli government website (Archived here), under the banner of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which claims to show evidence of bias in "UN (United Nations) agencies regarding Israel, documenting quotes and official statements by UN agencies and officials since outbreak of the war in Gaza in October of 2023.

"Since the Hamas atrocities of October 7th, the longstanding bias and breaches of neutrality by certain professional bodies of the United Nations have been exposed in a blatant and undeniable manner. Key United Nations agencies have spread misleading information and applied double standards when addressing Israel's actions and the broader conflict. They have been misleading both the political and public discourse and serve as a major source of misinformation in international legal proceedings against Israel," the website reads.

Multiple advertisements paid for by the agency linked to an Israeli government website (Archived here) page hosted by govextra.gov.il, which claimed to expose “The Connection Between UNRWA and Hamas in Gaza.

Israel has long accused UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, of standing in the way of lasting peace and "perpetuating the refugee issue" in the region.

The Israeli government accused UNRWA employees of being complicit in the 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel, and in October 2024, Israel’s parliament passed a bill designating UNRWA as a terrorist group and prohibiting it from operating within the country.

Amid an ongoing investigation, 13 employees of UNRWA were fired, nine of whom an oversight committee said may have been involved in the attack on Israel in October of 2023.

The Eurovision Song Contest has been contacted for comment. (See Update 1)

Update 1

In reply to a request for comment from Eurovision Spotlight, Martin Green CBE, Director of the Eurovision Song Contest, said:

“Our voting partner Once has confirmed that a valid vote was recorded in all countries participating in this year’s Grand Final and in the Rest of the World. The voting operation for the Eurovision Song Contest is the most advanced in the world and each country’s result is checked and verified by a huge team of people to exclude any suspicious or irregular voting patterns. An independent compliance monitor reviews both jury and public vote data to ensure we have a valid result.

The Eurovision Song Contest's rules are designed to ensure a fair and neutral competition. These rules do not prohibit participating broadcasters or third parties such as record labels or others from promoting their entries online and elsewhere, as long as such promotion does not instrumentalize the Contest or breach its editorial guidelines. Many delegations employ paid promotion campaigns to support the song, profile, and future careers of their artists.”

Update 2

Further analysis of the YouTube account conducted by the Eurovision News Spotlight team, using the U.S.-based social media analytics website SocialBlade, revealed that the channel lost 28,643,641 views from its total count on May 17. This suggests that the account holder may have deleted video content from the channel.

Additionally, an examination of the account using the Wayback Machine shows a screenshot captured on May 15 that links to an unlisted YouTube video on the channel titled "Vote 'New Day Will Rise' | Yuval Raphael | Eurovision 2025 | Second Semi-Final (15.5)."

According to the YouTube stats, the video, which was published on April 29, 2025, had received over 25.2 million views. Reports from SocialBlade indicate that the video was removed from the channel on the day of the Eurovision Song Contest Grand Final.

It remains unclear whether the video gained additional views on the channel before it was removed or if any further videos were deleted from or marked private on the account.

View the full interactive investigation here.

Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) tanks fired on UN bases in southern Lebanon, in the context of what Israel has called “targeted” raids against Hezbollah. International peacekeeping soldiers from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were injured, and the mission’s surveillance systems on the border were hit. The UN has called these attacks “deliberate”, saying they may amount to war crimes. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said these charges are “completely false”, and the IDF insisted the raids are not “directed at UNIFIL posts, forces, or infrastructure”.

A detailed analysis of visual evidence acquired through open-source investigation and official accounts from both IDF and UNIFIL shows that at least four of these Israeli military operations have hit directly inside or immediately next to clearly identified UN posts that operate under the mandate of United Nations Security Council resolution 1701.

By striking UNIFIL’s surveillance capabilities and infrastructure, the IDF is hindering the UN’s ability to carry out humanitarian missions and monitor military activities by all parties, both of which UNIFIL is tasked with under UN resolutions. Footage and photos from the area available through satellite imagery, eyewitness media and official sources also show that the IDF appears to be clearing the area along the de facto border, or Blue Line, as part of its operation “Northern Arrows” against Hezbollah operatives, weapons and resources.

"This military activity that is taking place in close proximity to UNIFIL bases, or that is directly targeting the facilities themselves, injuring peacekeepers, are on the one hand deliberate attacks on civilians and therefore, it may amount to war crimes", says Human Rights Watch Lebanon researcher Ramzi Kaiss. "But at the same time, they're also impeding UNIFIL’s ability to perform their humanitarian function, which is having many other effects on people in the south, including people's ability to access healthcare care, to access basic services, and humanitarian aid that UNIFIL is entrusted with enabling its delivery".

European governments, who have thousands of troops stationed along the Israel-Lebanon border, have said strikes on UNIFIL positions are “unacceptable”. The UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has also said these incidents are “a breach of international law, international humanitarian law, and may constitute a war crime”. Guterres had previously been declared “persona non grata” by Foreign Minister Israel Katz over what he described as a failure to condemn Iran's missile attacks and antisemitic and anti-Israel conduct. Relations between the UN and Israel have been frayed since the Gaza war started a year ago. 

Prime Minister Netanyahu has asked UNIFIL to withdraw five kilometres into Lebanon from the current de facto border, to “keep out of harm’s way”, while Israeli commando and paratrooper brigades operate inside Lebanese territory for the first time in nearly two decades.

“We don’t know what their intentions are”, says Middle East expert Vanessa Newby, an assistant professor at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs of Leiden University. "One could be that they want UNIFIL to move back the five kilometers that they've requested, in order to continue their operations on Hezbollah's infrastructure. And that may well mean a lot more bombing, which could of course target civilian infrastructure. And if UNIFIL are not there to observe, there's really no international observation going on in that area of South Lebanon. And the reason we are possibly all a little suspicious is because there have been incidences of cameras being shot out on the UNIFIL compounds. So that's one possibility, that they have plans to make a narrow strip of land on the blue line, almost uninhabitable".

The United Nations and officials in troop-contributing countries say the monitoring by the Blue Helmets is needed now more than ever. “The devastation and destruction of many villages along the Blue Line, and even beyond, is shocking”, said UNIFIL spokesperson Andrea Tenenti.

The Attacks on UNIFIL Bases - Operation "Northern Arrows"

On the last day in September, UNIFIL said it had received notification from Israel of its plans to enter Lebanon as part of its military operation “Northern Arrows” against Hezbollah capabilities in the region. 

A week later, on October 6, UNIFIL confirmed IDF activity “immediately adjacent” to its position 6-52, near the town of Maroun al-Ras, a post staffed by Irish peacekeepers. Over the following two weeks, up to and including October 22, there were eight more statements from the UN mission, detailing incidents in which its bases were  “deliberately” fired upon or damaged by IDF machinery, “forcibly” entered, and subjected to smoke exposure that left 15 peacekeepers in need of medical treatment. Five other UN peacekeepers in Lebanon have been hospitalised for injuries sustained in falls from observation towers and a shooting, UNIFIL said.

Between October 9 and October 22, five UNIFIL observation towers were directly struck or damaged, with four of the incidents directly attributed by UNIFIL to Israeli forces, and one where there was no mention of the origin of the attack.

IDF bulldozers damaged the walls at two bases, and the monitoring cameras at two positions came under Israeli fire, the UN mission said.

A closer look at what happened in four of the UN posts affected reveals similarities in the type of targets, methods, and damage inflicted directly on UN installations and soldiers. The level of military planning and damage seen on the ground raises questions over the IDF’s claims of self-defence or inevitable collateral damage as a result of its operations against Hezbollah.

UNIFIL Headquarters in Naqoura

UNIFIL claims IDF tanks deliberately fired upon its headquarters in Naqoura, injuring peacekeepers and damaging surveillance installations and infrastructure. The IDF says it was responding to an “immediate threat” and had given enough warning for the Blue Helmets to remain in protected spaces.

On October 10, two Indonesian peacekeepers spent three days in intensive care after an IDF Merkava tank fired its weapon toward an observation tower at the base, directly hitting it and causing the pair to fall, according to UNIFIL.

The IDF said its personnel had fired upon an "immediate threat against them" on October 11, approximately 50 metres from the UNIFIL post, resulting in the injury of the two peacekeepers. The IDF said that it had instructed the UN forces in the area to remain in "protected spaces" hours before the incident, adding that the evacuation order was in place at the time of fire.

A day later, UNIFIL again reported that IDF artillery had struck the Naqoura base, saying two explosions close to an observation tower injured two Sri Lankan peacekeepers.

A third incident later that day saw a member of the Blue Helmets undergo surgery for a bullet wound "due to ongoing military activity nearby." This time, UNIFIL said it did not know the origin of the gunfire.

A UNIFIL video released on October 17 claimed to show extensive damage inflicted on a base by Israeli forces.

The video reveals structural damage to Observation Post 14, at the west of the base, 30 metres from the installation's perimeter fence and just over two kilometres to the north of the Blue Line.

Analysis of the tower's damage shows that a projectile damaged the observation post on its southeastern-facing side. In UNIFIL's video of the scene, no damage was observed to the north face of the tower, indicating it was hit from a south-south westerly-facing position.

"The damage is consistent with what you'd see from several different variants of tank projectiles fired by a Merkava tank," former US Army senior explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team member Trevor Ball concluded.

In a video statement documenting the incident on October 25, the Indonesian peacekeepers said the incident occurred after they noticed a "laser beam targeting" them shortly after beginning their rotation at Observation Post 14. 

"We immediately started surveillance and reconnaissance and took the initiative to turn off the lights on the fourth floor and turn on the lights on the second floor, UNIFIL Peacekeeper Private Eggy Arifiyyanto said.

The pair, who have since returned to active duty, said after coordinating with another tower at the base it was confirmed a laser was targeting them.

"We immediately reported it to our higher command, and just after a projectile was launched from a Merkava tank and hit our observation tower right there", Private Arifiyyanto said while pointing at the damaged Observation Post 14.

"When the tank shell exploded inside, we were thrown upward and then tried to find an escape route. I jumped from the fourth floor to the third floor and jumped again to the second floor, rolling over, fearing a second attack. We then made our way to the shelter to be picked up and evacuated by the hospital team," Arifiyyanto said.

While the IDF claimed it was firing upon an immediate threat in the area, satellite imagery shows no other visible installations within a 350-metre radius outside the base perimeter near the tower.

"I think it's unlikely there was an immediate threat within 50 metres, if there are no structures within 350 metres. If there's no decent cover or concealment, such as trees, brush, or possible tunnels, this makes it even less likely. It is possible though," former US Army explosives expert Ball said. 

"There's a lot of reasons the IDF could have perceived a threat, legitimate or not. It could range from UN personnel moving in a way they perceived might be Hezbollah or other militants, or just IDF troops being mistaken, disoriented to where the UNIFIL positions were," he added.

Footage of the immediate aftermath of the attack provided by UNIFIL shows damage to a road and a UN vehicle inside the base. The damage on the road shows a crater several metres wide and over 30 centimetres deep, consistent with the impact of a large explosive shell. 

The UN vehicle parked beside the crater appears to have suffered secondary damage rather than a direct hit, with the vehicle's panelling showing several holes, indicating it was hit by shrapnel following an explosion.

"The UNIFIL truck did not suffer a "direct" hit, but some of the damage is from the blast wave of the nearby explosions that caused the craters, as well as the fragmentation from those explosions," Ball said.

Geolocated to the northeast of the base, the crater is over 100 metres inside the northern perimeter fence and over 175 metres from the perimeter to the east. 

Satellite imagery indicates no apparent overground installations or targets within 180 metres of the base's north perimeter and none up to 800 metres to the east.

UNIFIL base UNP 6-52 near Maroun Al-Ras

The IDF established a military presence in advance of its operations, in an area immediately adjacent to a clearly marked UN base. It conducted airstrikes in the nearby civilian area of Maroun al-Ras, where IDF soldiers were seen raising Israeli flags.

Satellite imagery captured by Planet Labs before Israel started its Lebanon incursions shows UNP 6-52 near the village of Maroun al-Ras, where about 30 Irish troops were based at the time.

Comparative satellite imagery from October 5 shows a build-up of more than 30 Israeli military vehicles near the UN base. It also shows that roads adjacent to the base had been cleared, and nearby orchards cleared.

These movements of the IDF forces coincided with the release of further footage by the IDF of its Commando Brigade operating in southern Lebanon as part of the ongoing incursion. The IDF claimed on October 8 that the commandos had dismantled infrastructure belonging to Hezbollah, including tunnel shafts and weapons storage facilities. Missile launch facilities and observation posts used by Hezbollah had also been dismantled, the IDF said, adding that “dozens” of militants had been killed.

In response, UNIFIL said it was “deeply concerned” by the IDF’s activities adjacent to 6-52, saying it was “unacceptable to compromise the safety of UN peacekeepers carrying out their Security Council-mandated tasks.”

Further satellite imagery showed the nearby village of Maroun al-Ras, just over two kilometres from 6-52, where Israeli military vehicles could also be observed on October 5. 

The ruins of Iran Garden Park, a replica of JerusalLm’s Dome of the Rock, could also be seen, while several fields surrounding the village had also been cleared, similarly to those adjacent to 6-52.

Other videos circulated on social media show Israeli soldiers raising flags in the ruins of the Iran Garden park in Maroun al-Ras. 

UNIFIL base UNP 1-31 in Labbouneh

UNIFIL says the IDF fired at its cameras, struck a bunker, and knocked over several walls at an Italian base. The IDF claimed it found a cache of Hezbollah weapons and tunnels metres from the same outpost days later.

The Italian-crewed United Nations base 1-31 in Labbouneh is one of the closest UNIFIL structures to Israel, with its wall almost touching the Blue Line. It was among the first to be directly caught in the line of fire when Israel launched Operation Northern Arrows in Lebanon. Since then, UNP 1-31 has been subject to several incidents involving Israeli troops. 

On October 13, the IDF announced it had uncovered “hundreds of weapons, including firearms, grenades, and rocket launchers” in underground compounds “from a few dozen metres up to a few hundred metres from UNIFIL posts situated near the Blue Line”. 

In the same statement, the IDF said that over the previous month, approximately 25 missiles and rockets were launched at Israeli communities and IDF troops from these Hezbollah compounds “embedded near UNIFIL posts”. It did not give an exact location for the images released with the statement, showing weapons and tunnel shafts, but we were able to geolocate much of the imagery to the area around 1-31, allowing us to link the events in the IDF statement to updates provided by UNIFIL. 

The IDF also released an infographic map described as showing Hezbollah launch areas that were within 300 metres of UNIFIL posts.

In the days before the IDF’s announcement, UNIFIL had reported several incidents in which its monitoring and communications infrastructure, as well as the perimeter wall of the base itself, were damaged by IDF forces.

According to accounts by UNIFIL, on October 9, the IDF “deliberately fired at and disabled” the perimeter-monitoring cameras at the outpost. The next day, UNIFIL detailed an incident in which IDF soldiers again fired on the UN base, hitting the entrance to a bunker sheltering peacekeepers and damaging vehicles and a communications system. No injuries were reported. An IDF drone was also seen flying inside the base during the incident— all the way up to the bunker entrance, UNIFIL said. The IDF did not release any remarks about this operation, making only general statements about its dozens of strikes against “Hezbollah targets” in southern Lebanon the same day, without giving specific locations.

The description given by UNIFIL about direct fire into the post and the flying of a drone up to the exact area struck – the entrance to a bunker – suggests the Israeli soldiers had knowledge of where they were targeting their fire.

On October 11 an IDF armoured bulldozer struck the perimeter wall of the base, causing the collapse of several modular concrete barriers, known as T-walls, UNIFIL said. IDF tanks were also moving around close to the base at the time, the UN mission added.

Meanwhile, the IDF statement on its weapons and tunnels discovery was released the same day journalists were touring with the Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. One journalist, who was on the press trip for the Washington Post, wrote that “most of the weapons described had already been removed, and reporters were not allowed to leave the company of Israeli soldiers”.

Footage shared by an Israeli journalist embedded with the Israeli forces in southern Lebanon that day showed a tunnel near to an unspecified UN base in the border region, which we have been able to geolocate as UNP 1-31.

In the video, the journalist can be heard talking about how the tunnel was uncovered near peacekeepers at a position just a few dozen metres away. The post accompanying the video described the weapons and tunnels in the scene, saying that “under the noses of the UNIFIL soldiers, Hezbollah built and dug military forts - which overlook the settlements of the Western Galilee, and are prepared to raid the settlements of the Galilee”. Journalist Doron Kadosh added in his tweet that the “UNIFIL force saw everything. Now they will no longer be able to hide”.

This video, from another journalist on the press tour of the area, shows the same location and a vertical shaft.

A white UN observation tower is visible in the footage posted by journalists on the tour. Within a similar distance from the tunnels, there is another, darker-coloured observation tower, which we have been able to determine is an Israeli watchtower across the border. This gave us a basis to begin our geolocation to confirm the whereabouts of this base and determine what troops are stationed there.

During the attack, several Israeli soldiers were injured. This triggered an evacuation mission for the IDF, with a tank tasked with bringing those injured away from the fighting.

The UNP 1-31 base goes right up to the Blue Line. In satellite imagery, the sharp U-turned end of the Israeli border wall is visible.

It matches this video posted by an Italian journalist, described as showing the distance from 1-31 to an Israeli observation tower in September 2024. The border wall can be seen curving around before turning back down the hill behind the tower. That video also shows what appears to be an Italian flag painted onto the interior wall of the base, which we will examine later.

We already have evidence that the IDF was operating in the area around UNP 1-31 in the days leading up to Sunday, October 13. The UNIFIL statement on October 11 referenced an IDF Caterpillar — a piece of heavy machinery for digging and moving earth — that damaged the base.

Footage released by the IDF on the evening of October 13, shows an IDF Caterpillar D9 armored bulldozer operating in the background as a soldier talks to camera. The beginning of the clip shows the soldier pointing to the same observation tower seen in the journalists’ footage — which we have determined to be UNP 1-31 – with the Israeli tower also visible in the background.

Israel has used bulldozers for its military for decades. Images of the modified, heavily-armoured versions of the machines are readily available online and feature in news reports about Israel’s invasion of the Gaza Strip. The IDF released this image of a D9 bulldozer at work in southern Lebanon on October 10, without giving a specific location.

The IDF released several other video clips in the same October 13 statement, which described Hezbollah weapons and tunnels discovered by the 146th Division near a UNIFIL base.

Not all of them showed a wide enough view for geolocation to be possible, but a video shot by a drone gave us the clearest look so far at the UNIFIL base near which these Israeli forces were operating that day.

There are several geographic markers by which we were able to confirm this as UNP 1-31, by comparing the view in the drone footage with satellite imagery from around the base. The blocks lining the curved roadway up to the entrance of the base, the positioning of the front walls, and the internal structures seen in the drone footage all match with satellite imagery.

The mural of the Italian flag on the wall, seen in the video shared by Italian journalist Nello Scavo, is also visible near the watchtower.

One of the videos accompanying the IDF statement shows a soldier pointing to the same observation tower seen in the journalists’ footage — which we have determined to be UNP 1-31 – with the Israeli tower also visible in the background.

In the IDF footage, the soldier shows what he describes as connected shafts in the ground, before giving the names of the Israeli communities located down the hillside: Shlomi, Hanita and Ya’ara. UNP 1-31 overlooks these areas.

This analysis confirms that the IDF was working in close proximity to UNP 1-31 around the time UNIFIL said the base had been fired on and damaged by a bulldozer, damaging its surveillance capabilities. Days later, the IDF announced that it found a cache of weapons and tunnels in the same area, in the vicinity of UNP 1-31

UNIFIL base UNP 5-42 in Ramyah

IDF tanks breach the entrance of the base while evacuating soldiers under enemy fire. Conflicting IDF & UNIFIL accounts of danger posed to UN troops, with 15 soldiers requiring medical treatment.

The incident in Ramyah, near the centre of the Blue Line, gives an example of the differing takes offered by the IDF and UNIFIL about the same event.

The Israeli military released a short statement on Sunday, October 13, recounting an incident in an area they simply described as “southern Lebanon”. They said that earlier that day, a “large barrage of anti-tank missiles” was fired toward IDF troops.

During the attack, several Israeli soldiers were injured. This triggered an evacuation mission for the IDF, with a tank tasked with bringing those injured away from the fighting.

“An initial review showed that an IDF tank that was trying to evacuate injured soldiers while still under fire backed several metres into a UNIFIL post”, said the IDF statement. “Once the enemy fire stopped, and following the evacuation of the injured soldiers, the tank left the post.”

The Israeli military also confirmed its use of a smoke screen during the incident, “to provide cover for the evacuation of the injured soldiers”. The IDF said it stayed in touch with UNIFIL to “maintain coordination” during the incident, and that “no danger was posed to UNIFIL forces by the IDF activity”.

A UNIFIL statement on the incident offers a different version of events. Without giving a base number, it said that its troops near Ramyah “observed three platoons of IDF soldiers crossing the Blue Line into Lebanon”. At around 4:30 a.m., while the peacekeepers were in shelters, “two IDF Merkava tanks destroyed the position’s main gate and forcibly entered the position”.

The IDF “requested multiple times that the base turn out its lights”, according to UNIFIL. “The tanks left about 45 minutes later after UNIFIL protested through our liaison mechanism, saying that IDF presence was putting peacekeepers in danger.”

Referring to what the Israeli military said was its use of a smoke screen, UNIFIL said that at around 6:40 a.m. the same morning, peacekeepers at the same base said several rounds were fired 100 metres north, which emitted smoke. “Despite putting on protective masks, 15 peacekeepers suffered effects, including skin irritation and gastrointestinal reactions, after the smoke entered the camp.”

The IDF didn’t give an exact location for this base, but UNIFIL did say it was in Ramyah. Our analysis using satellite imagery from the area and comparing it with maps showing UNIFIL’s deployments throughout Lebanon, shows that it is UNP 5-42, an outpost crewed by troops from Ghana.

It is another of the closest UNIFIL bases to the Blue Line, similar to 1-31 in that it sits at a point where the Blue Line takes a 90-degree turn.

The IDF didn’t give an exact location for this base, but UNIFIL did say it was in Ramyah. Our analysis using satellite imagery from the area and comparing it with maps showing UNIFIL’s deployments throughout Lebanon, shows that it is UNP 5-42, an outpost crewed by troops from Ghana.

Satellite imagery shows an installation at the other side of the Blue Line. It matches the description of the IDF’s Livna outpost in this Hebrew Wikipedia entry. 

On closer inspection of the gate area at the entrance of UNP 5-42, we can see that there is a driveway of nearly 20 metres between the external gate and the inner perimeter wall. The IDF described how its tank “backed several metres into a UNIFIL post”, but made no mention of it knocking down a gate to do so.

UNIFIL’s version of the story said that two tanks “destroyed” the position’s main gate and “forcibly entered” the camp. Upon analysing the layout of the entrance of the camp via satellite imagery, we can see that damage would have been caused to the gate in order for the tanks to move more than a metre past the front pier of the driveway. 

Israel said its activity did not pose UNIFIL forces any danger. However, the statement from the IDF reported its troops used the driveway of a UNIFIL property to take cover from — or at least wait out — an incoming missile attack.

Why are UN troops in Lebanon?

Historically, Lebanon has been the most dangerous UN peacekeeping mission, with 337 peacekeepers killed since it was established by the UN Security Council more than 45 years ago, following Israel’s first invasion into southern Lebanon in 1978. 

Its mandate, spelled out in UN resolution 1701, was to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the country, restore international peace and security, and assist the Lebanese government to restore its effective authority in the area. In 2006, this mandate was extended to include "assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons". 

In 2000 UNIFIL established the Blue Line along southern Lebanon, to ensure the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces. Since Lebanon and Israel have not agreed on an official border, its 120 kilometres act as a de facto border between the two countries. 

The area includes Hezbollah strongholds, and UNIFIL troops are tasked with monitoring border violations and keeping the area secure. 

While UNIFIL is a peacekeeping mission, troops can use force in certain circumstances, including self-defence, to protect civilians under the imminent threat of violence and to protect UN personnel facilities and equipment. 

UNIFIL’s mandate is renewed annually by the UN Security Council at the request of Lebanon. The Security Council most recently extended the mandate until August 31, 2025. 

As of September 2024, UNIFIL's force consists of more than 10,000 peacekeepers from 50 troop-contributing countries. The current UNIFIL mission comprises the highest number of European troop contingents of all peace operations worldwide, with the main contributors being Italy, Spain, Ireland, and France.

Additional reporting by Thais Porto, Tatum Brookes, Eoghan Sweeney, George Powell and Thomas Normann Hougaard of the Eurovision Social Newswire.
Sub-editor Eoghan Sweeney (EBU)

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